A large-scale phishing campaign deploys unauthorized ConnectWise ScreenConnect clients by impersonating trusted application stores and software update mechanisms. The campaign uses sophisticated social engineering pages replicating Google Meet, Microsoft Store, and Apple App Store experiences, with AI-assisted victim profiling scripts exfiltrating telemetry via Telegram Bot API. Payloads are distributed through attacker-controlled infrastructure, Amazon S3, and Cloudflare R2, with batch files performing silent MSI installation via UAC bypass techniques.
ScreenConnect
12 posts
Beyond ‘Fake Updates’: From Application Store-Themed Phishing to Large-Scale Distribution of ScreenConnect From CitrixBleed 2 to Cloudflared: The Tools and Techniques Behind Anubis Ransomware Attacks Arctic Wolf Labs documents Anubis ransomware affiliate tradecraft observed across multiple 2026 intrusions, featuring CitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777) exploitation and valid VPN credential abuse for initial access. Affiliates consistently deploy legitimate RMM tools for persistence, use Mimikatz and ntds.dit extraction for credential access, establish alternate egress via cloudflared and SSH SOCKS tunnels, and employ exfiltration tools like S3 Browser and rclone before deploying encryptors on Windows and Linux systems. The attack chain relies on commodity tools and living-off-the-land techniques that resemble legitimate administration in isolation but form a distinctive kill chain when correlated.
The SOC Files: ScreenConnect masked as freeware. An inside look at a large-scale campaign A large-scale campaign abuses the legitimate ScreenConnect remote management tool, distributed via 90+ spoofed freeware download sites using SEO poisoning, to silently deploy AsyncRAT. The attack uses DLL sideloading via a Microsoft-signed install.exe binary, followed by a multi-stage loader chain involving PowerShell and VBScript scripts that disable Defender, bypass UAC, and ultimately inject AsyncRAT into RegAsm.exe via process hollowing. The campaign targets both consumers and corporate networks across multiple languages and regions.
Major Cyber Attacks in May 2026: Fake Invitations, Agent Tesla, BlobPhish, and More In May 2026, ANY.RUN observed a surge in sophisticated phishing and malware campaigns utilizing fileless execution, browser-based credential theft, and legitimate workflow abuse. Key threats included Agent Tesla credential harvesting, ClickFix fileless malware, BlobPhish in-memory page generation, and phishing-to-RMM chains bypassing traditional MFA via real-time OTP interception.
Beyond the RaaS Headlines: The Reality of Ransomware Tradecraft The Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) ecosystem relies heavily on affiliates who dictate the actual intrusion tradecraft, meaning a single ransomware brand can be associated with vastly different attack chains. Affiliates frequently abuse legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools, exposed RDP, and vulnerable edge appliances for initial access, followed by the use of LOLBins and open-source utilities for persistence and data exfiltration.
Click, Install, Compromised: The New Wave of Zoom-Themed Attacks A recent phishing campaign impersonates Zoom meeting invitations to trick users into downloading a malicious VBS script disguised as a software update. This script silently installs ConnectWise ScreenConnect, a legitimate RMM tool, granting attackers persistent remote access to the compromised system for potential follow-on attacks such as credential theft, lateral movement, or ransomware deployment.
Phishing-to-RMM Attacks: The Remote Access Blind Spot CISOs Can’t Ignore Threat actors are increasingly leveraging phishing campaigns to deliver legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools like ScreenConnect and LogMeIn Rescue, bypassing traditional malware defenses. These attacks often utilize compromised domains, SEO injection, and VBS scripts to weaken endpoint controls (e.g., SmartScreen, Defender) before silently installing the RMM payload, creating significant visibility gaps for SOC teams.
Threat Advisory: Uptick in Bomgar RMM Exploitation Huntress has observed an uptick in threat actors exploiting CVE-2026-1731 in outdated Bomgar RMM instances to compromise organizations and their downstream clients. Attackers utilize this access to establish persistence via secondary RMM tools, evade defenses using BYOVD techniques, and ultimately deploy LockBit ransomware.
QEMU abused to evade detection and enable ransomware delivery Threat actors are actively abusing the QEMU hardware emulator to create hidden virtual machines on compromised hosts, effectively shielding their attack toolkits from endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions. Recent campaigns, including those linked to the PayoutsKing ransomware group, leverage this technique alongside vulnerability exploitation and legitimate remote access tools to establish persistence, harvest credentials, and exfiltrate data.
In-Memory Loader Drops ScreenConnect | ThreatLabz Attackers are utilizing a fake Adobe Acrobat Reader lure to deploy a highly obfuscated VBScript loader that executes a .NET payload entirely in-memory. The attack chain leverages PEB manipulation for process masquerading and abuses auto-elevated COM objects to bypass UAC, ultimately installing the legitimate ScreenConnect remote access tool for malicious purposes.
When tax season becomes cyberattack season: Phishing and malware campaigns using tax-related lures Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a significant increase in tax-themed phishing and malware campaigns targeting individuals and accounting professionals. These campaigns utilize sophisticated social engineering, Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platforms for credential theft, and abused legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools to establish persistent remote access.
From Invitation to Infection: How SILENTCONNECT Delivers ScreenConnect Elastic Security Labs identified a new .NET loader dubbed SILENTCONNECT, which is distributed via phishing emails and Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA pages. The loader utilizes living-off-the-land binaries, PEB masquerading, and UAC bypass techniques to silently install remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools like ScreenConnect for persistent access.
