Volexity discovered threat actor UTA0533 exploiting two zero-day vulnerabilities in SonicWall SMA 1000 series VPN appliances to achieve root-level remote code execution. CVE-2026-15409 enables pre-auth SSRF via /wsproxy to tunnel to localhost services, while CVE-2026-15410 enables command injection via path traversal in the sysCtrl.execRemoveHotfix endpoint. The actor deployed custom malware including KNUCKLEBALL (Java agent injector), ORANGETAIL (webshell), and ROOTRUN (privilege escalation binary), then used tcpdump to capture LDAP credentials and attempted lateral movement from over 200 IP addresses.
Persistence
50 posts
Proxying to Compromise: SonicWall Secure Mobile Access 0-day Exploitation Still Circling: Blind Eagle's Toolkit Keeps Evolving Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) has evolved its toolkit with three new obfuscation schemes, a GitHub-staged AutoIt3 RunPE loader, and a significantly upgraded AsyncRAT build codenamed JC-46 featuring WNF-based process injection, HVNC banking-fraud with browser profile cloning, and a Chrome App-Bound Encryption v20 bypass. A shared internal builder is evidenced by identical 'Photo Studio' persistence artifacts across three separately obfuscated toolchains. The group continues to rely on VBScript-to-PowerShell delivery chains and commodity RATs while selectively investing in components that directly serve banking-fraud objectives.
Three Steps to the Terminal: A Siemens ROX II Zero-Day Trilogy A chained exploit comprising three zero-day vulnerabilities in Siemens ROX II OT switches allows an attacker to escalate from arbitrary file disclosure to full persistent root-level access. CVE-2025-40948 leverages a root-privileged xz utility to read any file on the filesystem, CVE-2025-40947 exploits unsanitized input in the feature key signature verification to achieve command injection as root, and CVE-2025-40949 enables persistent code execution by injecting commands into the root cron table via the web management task scheduler. Siemens has released firmware V2.17.1 to address all three vulnerabilities.
ACR Stealer: Two observed intrusion chains amid increased threat activity Microsoft Defender Experts identified two prevalent ClickFix-based intrusion chains delivering ACR Stealer, a MaaS information stealer rebranded from Amatera Stealer. Campaign 1 leverages rundll32-driven WebDAV DLL loading, obfuscated PowerShell, Python loaders, scheduled-task persistence, and Fiber-API in-memory shellcode execution, with a subset using blockchain RPC endpoints (EtherHiding) as dead-drop C2 resolvers. Campaign 2 achieves near-fully fileless execution via MSHTA/COM-launched PowerShell that retrieves a payload hidden in JPEG steganography and executes it reflectively in memory, with both chains ultimately harvesting browser credentials, DPAPI secrets, and sensitive documents for exfiltration.
HelloNet campaign — new malicious modules launched through the ViPNet update system The HelloNet campaign is an active APT operation targeting large Russian organizations through the ViPNet secure networking software suite. Attackers achieve persistence by placing a malicious wtsapi32.dll in the ViPNet Update System directory, which is sideloaded by itcsrvup64.exe at OS startup. The loader (HelloInjector) injects into svchost.exe and deploys a modular toolkit including a network proxy, command executor, log cleaner, and a Rust-based backdoor. The campaign uses renamed PuTTY/Plink utilities for SSH reverse tunneling to C2 servers and employs IOCTL hooking to evade user-mode security solutions.
Hidden Infrastructure Exposed: ANY.RUN Reveals Hijacked Gov Websites Delivering Malware PhantomEnigma is an active Brazil-focused crimeware campaign that compromises government infrastructure (.gov.br portals and police mailboxes) to deliver a modular Node.js backdoor embedded in patched Boostnote/Electron applications via Delphi-compiled Inno Setup installers. The operation uses at least two beacon generations (GET /laravel.php and POST /nbw/), rotates C2 domains weekly behind Cloudflare, and leverages trusted government email channels to bypass SPF/DKIM/DMARC checks. ANY.RUN analysts linked 231 sandbox analyses through a recurring build-chain fingerprint and connected a separate Ofício-PC QR-code phishing arm to the same operator via shared compromised government hosts.
Unpacking the AsyncAPI npm supply chain compromise and import-time payload delivery A coordinated supply chain compromise of the @asyncapi npm organization delivered malicious payloads through five package versions published via the project's legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publishing pipeline. The attack originated from a pwn request exploiting a misconfigured pullrequesttarget workflow that exposed the asyncapi-bot PAT, enabling unauthorized commits to auto-publish branches. Unlike typical npm supply-chain attacks, the payload executes at import/require time rather than through lifecycle hooks, bypassing --ignore-scripts mitigations. The second stage fetches an encrypted ~8.2 MB Miasma modular runtime from IPFS, establishing C2 at 85.137.53.71 with OS-specific persistence and decentralized fallback channels.
Daxin Returns: Stealthy Malware Resurfaces in Taiwan Alongside a New Backdoor Symantec identified renewed activity of Backdoor.Daxin, a sophisticated China-linked kernel-mode rootkit that hijacks legitimate TCP connections for covert C2, on a Taiwan manufacturing subsidiary in May 2026, four years after its initial public disclosure. Alongside it, researchers discovered a new backdoor, Stupig, which abuses the Windows keyboard-layout provider mechanism to execute SYSTEM-level commands from the logon screen pre-authentication and hook credential-handling APIs within winlogon.exe. Compile timestamps on both tools date to 2013 despite the host having no telemetry until 2026, suggesting a potentially decade-plus dwell time enabled by likely initial access via an outdated, end-of-life Digiwin SSO/JDK deployment.
Case Study: Distribution of a CoinMiner Targeting Linux SSH Servers via Malware Distribution via Network Transmission ASEC identified a multi-component Linux malware campaign targeting poorly managed SSH servers. The attack chain uses Go-based propagation malware to worm-like spread XMRig CoinMiner across SSH-accessible servers. The XMRig variant implements robust persistence via systemd services, cron jobs, and a /dev/shm watchdog, while XHide and Shc-compiled obfuscation scripts disguise mining activity by spoofing process names and hijacking common administrative commands through .bashrc aliases.
The serpent’s tongue: Luring the Python out of its den This article provides a comprehensive analysis of how malicious Python packages can execute arbitrary code during installation and runtime, categorizing techniques into build hook abuses (setup.py command classes, .pth files, site hooks, PYTHONPATH manipulation) and package content abuses (init.py, main.py, entry point hijacking, package overriding). Each technique is assessed for persistence, OS support, and distribution compatibility. The article highlights that developers are high-value targets due to administrative access to sensitive assets, and that payload execution can occur within minutes of package installation with exfiltration within an hour.
Compromised npm Packages in the AsyncAPI Namespace Deliver Miasma Botnet Loader Socket's Threat Research Team identified four compromised npm packages in the @asyncapi namespace delivering a multi-stage botnet loader called Miasma. The attack injects obfuscated JavaScript into package source files that executes at module load time (bypassing npm lifecycle script blocking), spawns a detached Node.js process to download an encrypted payload from IPFS, and deploys a 3+ MB tasking framework with multi-channel C2 capabilities including HTTP, Nostr, IPFS, and Ethereum RPC. The malicious packages were published via GitHub Actions trusted publishing from a compromised source commit on the 'next' branch.
Home Field Advantage: How Attackers Reshape Victim Environments A threat actor exploited an SQL injection vulnerability in an IIS web application to gain initial access to a Windows endpoint running MSSQL. After access, the attacker performed extensive environment modifications including reconnaissance via tasklist, exfiltration to an OAST domain, creation of a new local administrator account, enabling Terminal Services, disabling Windows Defender, installing BadIIS modules, deploying an XMRig cryptocurrency miner with persistence, and adding CnCrypt Protect for defense evasion. The breadth of modifications on a single endpoint was notable compared to similar incidents.
13th July – Threat Intelligence Report This weekly threat intelligence bulletin covers multiple significant incidents including autonomous LLM-driven ransomware (JadePuffer), a cryptocurrency supply chain compromise via malicious npm packages, and three critical CVEs affecting Langflow, Tenda routers, and Linux KVM. Iran-linked Cavern Manticore and China-linked UAT-7810 were profiled targeting Israeli and networking infrastructure respectively. The report also highlights risks in AI development tools where hidden malicious instructions in open-source files could achieve RCE through Claude Code and OpenAI Codex.
jscrambler npm Package Compromised in Supply Chain Attack A compromised release of the jscrambler npm package (versions 8.14.0 through 8.20.0) delivered a Rust-built cross-platform infostealer via hidden native binaries embedded in an obfuscated CSI container. The malware executes automatically during npm install via a preinstall hook or, in later versions, through injected self-executing functions in package entry points, evading --ignore-scripts protections. The infostealer broadly harvests developer credentials including cryptocurrency wallets, AI assistant API keys, cloud provider credentials, browser data, and messaging app tokens, exfiltrating them over TLS via rustls.
Hiding in the Chain: Multi-Stage LNK Attack Leveraging TON Blockchain to Deliver Node.JS Backdoor A multi-stage attack campaign uses malicious LNK files delivered via booking-themed phishing emails to deploy a Node.js-based backdoor. The LNK files use bigint arithmetic obfuscation to reconstruct C2 URLs, download a PowerShell payload that deploys a legitimate node.exe binary, and execute an AES-128-CBC encrypted JavaScript backdoor. The backdoor retrieves its C2 address from the TON blockchain using the EtherHiding technique, employs a custom bytecode VM interpreter for defense evasion, and supports downloading and executing additional payloads including PE files, PowerShell, and JavaScript.
Malicious Go Module Exposes GitHub Malware Lure Network Spanning 222 Repositories Operation Muck and Load is a supply chain attack campaign centered on a malicious Go module that impersonates a DNS scanner tool to deliver a multi-stage Windows malware loader. The campaign leverages 222 GitHub lure repositories across 190 accounts with automated commit-farming workflows to create false credibility, and uses public dead-drop resolvers across multiple platforms for resilient payload-location resolution. The final payload chain delivers AsyncRAT, Quasar, Remcos, Vidar infostealer, and cryptominers through password-protected 7z archives extracted into masqueraded Microsoft-themed directories.
One Email Closer to the Edge: UNK_MassTraction & the Physics of Exploitation UNK_MassTraction, a suspected China-aligned threat cluster, has been exploiting chained n-day vulnerabilities in Roundcube mailservers (CVE-2024-42009 XSS followed by CVE-2025-49113 PHP deserialization) targeting physics and engineering departments at US and Canadian universities since May 2026. The campaign deploys a custom JavaScript credential stealer (IceCube), a webshell (SquareShell), and the VShell backdoor via an in-memory ELF loader, treating mailservers as edge devices for network pivot. The tooling demonstrates mature operational security including anti-forensics, fallback mechanisms, and process spoofing.
Vidar Stealer Unmasked: Code Signing Abuse, Go Loaders and File Inflation A financially motivated campaign active in April 2026 delivers Vidar stealer and XMRig cryptocurrency miner to victims worldwide via malvertising for fake software cracks. The campaign uses the Factory-v3 Go loader framework with per-build unique binaries, fabricated Authenticode certificates impersonating legitimate brands, file-size inflation up to 491 MB to evade sandbox analysis, and an in-memory AMSI bypass. Vidar exfiltrates browser credentials, cookies, and crypto wallets to C2 servers, while XMRig mines Monero using the pool.supportxmr.com mining pool. The operator receives Telegram notifications for each new infection.
ClickFix to Cash-Out: Anatomy of a Mexican Banking-Fraud Toolkit REF6045 is an operator-assisted Mexican banking fraud operation that uses ClickFix fake CAPTCHA pages to deliver the SCMBANKER PowerShell toolkit. Once installed, the toolkit monitors for banking sessions, captures screenshots, deploys vishing overlays, hijacks clipboard data to swap CLABE and card numbers, redirects browsers to phishing pages, and silently installs Remote Utilities as a persistent RAT. The operation's infrastructure suffered significant OPSEC failures including open directories, a leaked web-root archive, and an unauthenticated configuration editor.
Banana RAT Evolves: Comparing Two Recent Branches Through ANY.RUN An exposed public index on 198.245.53.26 revealed two evolutionary branches of Banana RAT, a Brazilian banking-oriented RAT. The older branch (May 2026) used static ETW-themed installation paths and a pseudo-Microsoft C2 domain (c.windowns-cdn.com), while the newer branch (June 2026) shifted to randomized install identifiers, VBS-assisted persistence via hidden SYSTEM scheduled tasks, and WebSocket C2 over host-specific testewin.com subdomains derived from the victim's MachineGuid. Exposed backend scripts (servidorcompletopool.py, ofuscador.py) indicate an automated polymorphic payload generation platform. A shared fallback IP (149.56.12.51) anchors both branches to the same operator.
Hidden in Teams: DragonForce Attackers Weaponize Microsoft Teams Relays to Stay Hidden DragonForce ransomware operators deployed a novel Go-based backdoor called Backdoor.Turn that abuses Microsoft Teams TURN relay infrastructure to hide C2 traffic as legitimate Teams communications. The attack chain involves SQL/MSSQL server exploitation for initial access, DLL sideloading via VirtualBox/DbgView executables, multiple BYOVD techniques for defense evasion including a novel exploit of a Huawei driver, and ultimately DragonForce ransomware deployment. The group demonstrated exceptional sophistication with custom tooling and stealth techniques that evade standard network monitoring.
Backdoor.Mistic: New Backdoor May be Linked to Ransomware Access Broker Backdoor.Mistic is a new stealthy backdoor deployed in cybercrime intrusions since April 2026, using DLL sideloading via legitimate MpExtMs.exe and masquerading as EndpointDlp.dll. It executes payloads in memory with a self-deleting kill switch, enabling long-term covert access. Mistic is likely linked to Woodgnat (aka KongTuke), an initial access broker whose ModeloRAT toolkit has been used in attacks delivering Qilin ransomware, connecting this backdoor to the broader ransomware ecosystem.
Novel Java-Based QuimaRAT Targets Windows, macOS, and Linux QuimaRAT is a cross-platform, Java-based remote access trojan sold as a malware-as-a-service subscription on the dark web. It targets Windows, macOS, and Linux systems by embedding JNA native libraries for multiple architectures within a JAR archive built for Java SE 8. The RAT decrypts an internal configuration file using repeating-key XOR, performs anti-analysis and virtualization checks, establishes persistence via OS-specific mechanisms, and maintains resilient C2 communication through HANDSHAKE and HEARTBEAT protocols. With 23 implemented commands and 212 protocol-only commands, the platform is highly extensible through runtime modules and fileless payloads.
An Analysis of ValleyRAT Infection Campaigns from Fake Installers, Japanese Malicious Emails LevelBlue GSOC has identified accelerating ValleyRAT campaigns delivered through fake installers and malicious emails targeting Chinese and Japanese-speaking users. The email-based attack chain uses DLL sideloading via a legitimate VLC executable to load a malicious DLL that downloads an RC4-encrypted, Donut-generated ValleyRAT payload, which is then injected into a suspended rundll32.exe process for fileless execution. The malware incorporates extensive anti-analysis checks (memory size, sleep timing, CPU count, VHD boot detection) and establishes persistence via registry Run keys.
AsyncRAT and Remcos Delivered in Multi-Stage Phishing Campaign An active multi-stage phishing campaign distributes AsyncRAT and Remcos RATs through weaponized Excel attachments targeting sales, procurement, and vendor management staff globally. The infection chain uses VBA macros to retrieve HTA payloads via URL shorteners and Cloudflare Workers, with final payloads hidden via PNG steganography and loaded filelessly into memory via .NET assembly loading. The campaign demonstrates high-volume, automated payload generation with consistent obfuscation patterns including Base64 encoding, character substitution, and string reversal.
Don't Fear the Repo: UNK_DeadDrop Phishing Campaign Targets Developers to Steal Cryptocurrency UNK_DeadDrop is a likely North Korean threat actor conducting broad phishing campaigns targeting software developers with fake job offers and code review requests. The campaign delivers malicious GitHub/GitLab repositories that abuse VS Code and Cursor IDE task automation to silently execute cross-platform malware. Linux and macOS systems receive the Overlord Go RAT with custom credential and wallet theft modules, while Windows runs a fileless Node.js/Python pipeline inside the editor's Electron process. The malware exfiltrates cryptocurrency wallets, browser credentials, and OS keychain data to a hardcoded C&C server at 23.137.105.75:5173.
From CI/CD to Cloud Data: How Shai Hulud Persistence Leads to Redshift Breach The Shai Hulud supply chain worm, attributed to TeamPCP, compromises CI/CD pipelines by injecting malicious npm/PyPI packages that harvest build credentials and pivot into production AWS cloud infrastructure. In a confirmed breach, attackers stole Jenkins EC2 instance role credentials via the Instance Metadata Service (IMDS), used them from external IPs, escalated privileges by creating an IAM user with AdministratorAccess, modified Redshift and Aurora security groups to open network paths, enumerated Secrets Manager for warehouse credentials, and exfiltrated data via the Redshift Data API. The attack demonstrates that pipeline identity equals production identity, with explicit attacker naming conventions (exfil-s3-* policies, exfil STS session names) providing high-fidelity detection opportunities.
Armored Likho digging a snake pit: inside the covert BusySnake Stealer campaign The Armored Likho APT group deploys a previously undocumented Python-based infostealer called BusySnake Stealer against government agencies and electric power sector organizations in Russia, Brazil, and Kazakhstan. The malware uses PyArmor Pro obfuscation, AI-generated first-stage loaders hosted on GitHub, and a modular C2 architecture to steal browser credentials, cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, 2FA secrets, Telegram data, and screenshots. The campaign demonstrates evolving TTPs including in-memory Python script execution, COM-based scheduled task persistence, and integrated reverse SSH tunneling that receives keys directly from the C2 server.
Miasma Mini Shai-Hulud Hits LeoPlatform npm Packages and GitHub Actions, Expands to the Go Ecosystem A new wave of the Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma/Hades supply chain attack campaign has compromised 23 npm packages across the LeoPlatform and RStreams ecosystems, plus the Verana Blockchain Go module. The attack uses binding.gyp install-time execution (Phantom Gyp pattern) to trigger multi-stage obfuscated JavaScript loaders that decrypt AES-GCM payloads, stage execution through Bun to evade Node.js security hooks, and steal developer/CI/CD credentials including npm, GitHub, cloud, and AI-agent tokens. The campaign also poisons GitHub Actions workflows and plants persistence hooks in AI coding assistant configurations, creating delayed execution surfaces that survive package remediation.
Missed incidents, persistent threats, and response gaps: Insights from compromise assessment projects Kaspersky's 2025 compromise assessment report reveals that organizations consistently fail to detect long-dwelling threats, with 30.8% of incidents persisting over 3 months and 52% of high-severity compromises going undetected for 90+ days. Key findings include widespread abuse of LoLBins and remote management tools in every incident-bearing engagement, 40% of web shells surviving in backups to be restored post-remediation, and a strong correlation between in-house forensics/reverse-engineering capability and reduced incident severity. Multiple case studies document dormant crypto-mining on domain controllers (4 years), in-memory LionTail implants on critical servers, PurpleFox rootkit infections evading EDR with disabled memory scanning, and ClipBanker persistence via registry Run keys with Defender exclusions.
ARToken: Inside an EvilTokens affiliate panel targeting Microsoft 365 Cisco Talos identified ARToken, a phishing-as-a-service platform linked to EvilTokens, that abuses Microsoft's OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant to bypass MFA and capture victim tokens. The platform provides affiliates with a comprehensive post-compromise toolkit including PRT-based persistence surviving password resets, BEC email operations, inbox rule manipulation, and SharePoint exfiltration. ARToken deploys a sophisticated seven-layer client-side anti-analysis system and abuses legitimate sharepoint.com URLs from attacker-controlled Microsoft 365 workspaces to evade security scanners.
StealC and Amadey: Breaking down infostealers and the cybercrime services that deliver them StealC is a C++ malware-as-a-service infostealer that harvests credentials, cookies, and session tokens from browsers, email clients, crypto wallets, and gaming platforms, using APC injection to bypass Chromium App-Bound Encryption. Amadey is a modular MaaS loader that delivers StealC and other payloads through a rich backdoor command set including process injection, SOCKS proxying, RDP enablement, and hidden admin account creation. Microsoft DCU disrupted over 200 C2 domains and IPs associated with both threats in a coordinated action with Europol on June 24, 2026.
The Bear Necessities: A Look at the Drivers, Dynamics, and Applications of the Pro-Russia Influence Ecosystem Google Threat Intelligence Group analyzes the evolution of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem four years into the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, identifying a pivot from war-focused operations back to global strategic objectives targeting the West, NATO, and the EU. The ecosystem comprises six interconnected components — overt media, covert IO campaigns, hacktivism, cyber espionage, government direction, and outsourced proxies — that cross-promote and amplify narratives. Key trends include the increasing use of generative AI for content creation, the blending of cyber espionage with influence operations via hack-and-leak tactics, and the outsourcing of capability development to contractors like NTC Vulkan for plausible deniability.
The SOC Files: ScreenConnect masked as freeware. An inside look at a large-scale campaign A large-scale campaign abuses the legitimate ScreenConnect remote management tool, distributed via 90+ spoofed freeware download sites using SEO poisoning, to silently deploy AsyncRAT. The attack uses DLL sideloading via a Microsoft-signed install.exe binary, followed by a multi-stage loader chain involving PowerShell and VBScript scripts that disable Defender, bypass UAC, and ultimately inject AsyncRAT into RegAsm.exe via process hollowing. The campaign targets both consumers and corporate networks across multiple languages and regions.
ESET takes part in Operation Endgame to disrupt Amadey and Stealc ESET Research contributed to Operation Endgame, a coordinated global disruption targeting the Amadey botnet and Stealc infostealer MaaS ecosystems. The operation seized or rendered inoperative approximately 50 domains and nearly 200 active IP-based C&C servers. ESET provided technical analysis, C&C server lists, RC4 encryption keys, campaign/build identifiers, and clustering methodology based on long-term tracking of both malware families. The fragmented, affiliate-operated infrastructure model used by both services required advanced graph-based clustering of RC4 keys, build IDs, and C&C URL paths to identify high-priority targets for disruption.
Gamaredon in 2025: Leveraging tunnels, workers, dead drops, and new alliances Gamaredon, a Russia-aligned APT group attributed to the FSB, maintained high operational tempo throughout 2025 with 35 spearphishing campaigns exclusively targeting Ukrainian government and military institutions. The group introduced six new PowerShell tools, resurrected the PteroSetup VBScript weaponizer for lateral movement, and began abusing CVE-2025-8088 (WinRAR) for persistence via the Startup folder. A significant infrastructure evolution occurred: C&C servers are now hidden behind tunnel services (Cloudflare tunnels, Cloudflare workers, Microsoft devtunnels, Loophole) and dead-drop resolutions on legitimate platforms (Telegram, Telegra.ph, Rentry, GoFile, Dropbox, and others), while stolen data is exfiltrated to S3-compatible cloud storage (Wasabi, Tebi, Intercolo) rather than attacker-owned servers.
- 19 minMonthly Recap — 2026-06-01 -> 2026-07-01
AI Attacked and Abused While Perimeter Authentication Collapses The month's defining shift was the emergence of AI as a two-sided battlefield: organizations deployed AI tools faster than they secured them, while attackers weaponized the same technology against defenders. Critical flaws in LangGraph allowed SQL injection chained to remote code execution, M365 Copilot could be turned into a one-click data exfiltration weapon via SearchLeak, and Langflow was exploited to deploy cryptominers. Meanwhile, the ongoing Shai-Hulud campaign injected prompts to blind AI malware scanners, macOS.Gaslight turned prompt injection against human analysts, and Russia's APT28 began experimenting with LLM-integrated malware. At the same time, perimeter authentication collapsed at scale: FortiBleed exposed credentials for over 73,000 FortiGate firewalls, CVE-2026-50751 let attackers bypass Check Point VPN authentication entirely, and ShinyHunters exploited an Oracle PeopleSoft zero-day across over 100 organizations. Supply chain attackers followed developers to their new AI tools, compromising the ecosystems where code is written and built. The Shai-Hulud/Miasma worm expanded from npm into PyPI and injected persistent backdoors into AI coding assistant configurations, while North Korea's Sapphire Sleet compromised over 140 Mastra npm packages to steal cryptocurrency wallets, and the ongoing GlassWorm campaign pivoted to WebAssembly malware in VS Code extensions using the Solana blockchain as command-and-control. Social engineering also industrialized: the ErrTraffic framework turned ClickFix deception into a Malware-as-a-Service operation with blockchain dead drops, and EvilTokens hid phishing flows inside browser-side encryption to defeat network scanners while hijacking Microsoft device-code authentication. Organizations should treat AI deployments as untrusted perimeter assets—restrict their network access, audit third-party skills and extensions, and assume prompt-injection attacks will target both automated scanners and human analysts. Every internet-facing VPN, firewall, and edge appliance should be patched immediately, with credentials rotated and phishing-resistant MFA enforced, because perimeter authentication failures now cascade directly into internal network compromise.
- 6 minWeekly Recap — 2026-06-22 -> 2026-06-29
Legitimate Tools Hijacked as AI Becomes the New Battleground The most damaging intrusions this week didn't rely on custom malware — they hijacked the legitimate tools and protocols organizations already trust. FortiBleed harvested real credentials from FortiGate firewall configurations worldwide, EvilTokens bypassed multi-factor authentication by abusing Microsoft's own device login flow, and a WhatsApp campaign installed legitimate ManageEngine remote management software to maintain persistent access. Simultaneously, attackers are learning to manipulate the AI systems defenders increasingly depend on. The macOS.Gaslight malware feeds fake error messages to AI analysis tools to blind security analysts, malicious skills on the OpenClaw marketplace trick AI assistants into executing harmful commands, and researchers demonstrated that chatbot reconnaissance can map an organization's defenses through casual conversation. Reset all FortiGate and VPN credentials immediately, scrutinize AI marketplace add-ons before installation, and assume that any legitimate-looking login prompt or remote management tool could be an attacker wearing a trusted disguise.
StrikeShark: investigating a new campaign delivering Cobalt Strike through SharkLoader The StrikeShark campaign utilizes a novel malware family named SharkLoader to deploy Cobalt Strike Beacons across various global sectors. Threat actors gain initial access by exploiting known vulnerabilities in public-facing applications or distributing custom droppers disguised as legitimate software. SharkLoader employs advanced evasion techniques, including Perfect DLL Hijacking and extensive API hooking, to bypass loader locks and conceal its execution in memory.
macOS.Gaslight | Rust Backdoor Turns Prompt Injection on the Analyst, Not the Sandbox SentinelLABS identified macOS.Gaslight, a DPRK-aligned Rust backdoor targeting macOS systems. The implant establishes a resilient C2 channel via the Telegram Bot API using AES-GCM over pinned TLS and achieves persistence via a masqueraded LaunchAgent. Notably, it embeds a 38-message prompt-injection payload designed to feed fabricated system errors to LLM-assisted triage tools, aiming to abort or corrupt automated analysis. The malware also stages a standalone Python environment to execute a credential and data stealer.
From package to postinstall payload: Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise by Sapphire Sleet Microsoft identified a large-scale npm supply chain attack by North Korean threat actor Sapphire Sleet, compromising over 140 packages in the Mastra ecosystem. The attackers used a compromised maintainer account to inject a malicious typosquat dependency that executes a cross-platform Node.js implant during installation, leading to cryptocurrency wallet theft, host reconnaissance, and persistent backdoor access.
Killing me gently: Inside Gentlemen’s EDR killer framework ESET researchers analyzed the Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation, highlighting their unique approach of providing an in-house developed EDR killer framework, GentleKiller, directly to affiliates. The framework leverages Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) techniques to terminate over 400 security processes and is augmented by third-party tools like HexKiller and HavocKiller, all standardized with a shared defense-evasion layer.
AI Generated ClickFix Attack Delivers SmartRAT | ThreatLabz ThreatLabz identified a ClickFix campaign utilizing AI-generated typosquatting domains to impersonate Brazilian banks and deliver a PowerShell-based banking RAT dubbed SmartRAT. The malware establishes persistence via scheduled tasks or Windows services, communicates over a custom TCP protocol on port 51888, and features advanced capabilities including keylogging, fake banking overlays, and QR code interception for financial fraud.
140+ Mastra npm Packages Compromised in Coordinated Supply Chain Attack A coordinated supply chain attack compromised over 140 npm packages in the Mastra namespace by injecting a typosquatted dependency, easy-day-js. This dependency uses a postinstall hook to execute a cross-platform Node.js infostealer that establishes persistence, inventories cryptocurrency wallets, steals browser history, and enables arbitrary remote code execution via a custom ICAP-style C2 protocol.
From Stars to Upvotes: Fake Reputation Fueling a Crypto Clipboard Hijacker A threat actor is distributing Rust-based cryptocurrency clipboard hijackers for Windows and macOS by disguising them as trading bots and game predictors. The campaign leverages extensive social engineering, utilizing 'Ghost Networks' to artificially inflate engagement metrics across GitHub, SourceForge, YouTube, and VirusTotal to establish false credibility. The malware achieves persistence and continuously monitors the victim's clipboard to replace legitimate cryptocurrency addresses with attacker-controlled wallets.
FishMonger’s arsenal upgraded: SprySOCKS for Windows ESET researchers discovered two undocumented Windows variants of the SprySOCKS backdoor, WINDRV and WINPLUS, attributed to the China-aligned FishMonger APT. These variants utilize advanced stealth techniques, including a custom kernel driver for hiding artifacts and diverting TCP traffic, as well as print processor abuse for persistence.
Public and Private Medical Community Targeted by China-Nexus Threat Actor Pursuing Artificial Intelligence, Cyber, Medical, and National Defense Research Google Threat Intelligence Group identified a PRC-nexus espionage campaign by UNC6508 targeting North American research and defense entities. The actors compromised REDCap servers to deploy INFINITERED, a custom malware that harvests credentials and intercepts software upgrades for persistence. Using stolen credentials, the attackers pivoted to administrative accounts and abused email content compliance rules to covertly exfiltrate sensitive intelligence.
Shai-Hulud: Miasma, Hades, & AI Scanner Evasion | ThreatLabz The Shai-Hulud software supply chain campaign has significantly evolved, expanding from npm to PyPI and shifting from maintainer compromise to CI/CD abuse. Recent waves demonstrate advanced techniques including OIDC token scraping to bypass SLSA provenance, IDE configuration file weaponization, and prompt injection designed to evade LLM-based security scanners.
OceanLotus: From external espionage to domestic targeting Between 2024 and 2026, the Vietnam-aligned threat actor OceanLotus (APT32) shifted its focus toward domestic espionage, conducting a supply-chain attack against the FireAnt MetaKit stock investment platform and compromising a major infrastructure corporation. The campaigns leveraged DLL side-loading to deploy the SPECTRALVIPER backdoor, which features advanced orchestration capabilities and exfiltrates encrypted host data via HTTP Cookie headers.
APT28, an evolution of tradecraft Sekoia's Threat Detection & Research team details the two-decade evolution of APT28's tradecraft, highlighting a strategic shift from monolithic implants to disposable, single-purpose tools and compromised edge-router infrastructure. Recent operations demonstrate a return to custom cloud-resident backdoors and novel experimentation with LLM-driven infostealers.
