GTIG tracks three suspected Russian espionage clusters (UNC6293, UNC7005, UNC5976) that compromise personal accounts by abusing legitimate authentication mechanisms rather than exploiting software vulnerabilities. Techniques include app password phishing, OAuth consent and cloud project token theft, Microsoft device code phishing, and WhatsApp device linking, in several cases combined with infostealer malware (VIDAR, ATOMIC, ENGINELIGHT, CHERRYPIE) and browser fingerprinting or headless-browser detection to evade analysis. UNC7005 infrastructure has been directly linked to the previously reported hospitality captive portal campaign, and functional overlaps suggest use of commercial Malware-as-a-Service and possibly LLM-assisted malware development.
OAuth Phishing
4 posts
Going with the Flow(s): Distinct Clusters Target Individuals of Interest to Russia Q2 2026 Attack Techniques Trend Report The Q2 2026 trend report from AhnLab ASEC documents a significant expansion of attack surfaces into AI stacks, identity infrastructure, and public-facing applications. CISA KEV listings rose 27% year-over-year to 75 entries, with ransomware-linked vulnerabilities nearly doubling. Notable developments include prompt injection-to-RCE chains in Microsoft Semantic Kernel, data exfiltration via M365 Copilot Enterprise (SearchLeak), three Microsoft Defender zero-days used for telemetry evasion, and continued AI supply chain attacks via malicious skills. The report recommends shifting from signature-based to behavior-based detection and implementing ITDR, conditional access, and AI-specific input validation controls.
Dangerous Invitations: Russian Threat Actor Spoofs European Security Events in Targeted Phishing Attacks Russian threat actor UTA0355 is conducting targeted phishing campaigns against foreign policy and government professionals by spoofing European security conferences. The attackers use rapport-building techniques and out-of-band messaging to trick victims into authorizing malicious Microsoft 365 OAuth applications and Device Code workflows, granting unauthorized access to their accounts.
Huntress Managed ITDR for Google Workspace: Defending the New Identity Attack Surface Threat actors are increasingly targeting Google Workspace as a foundational identity layer to pivot into interconnected SaaS applications. Modern attacks bypass traditional endpoint defenses by utilizing stolen credentials, OAuth abuse, and malicious inbox rules to conduct Business Email Compromise (BEC) and maintain persistent access.