Compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup application credential was abused to silently request app-only Microsoft Graph tokens from customer M365 tenants without passwords or MFA. The multi-tenant Entra application's service principal authenticated across customer tenants using the app's own identity. An automated script enumerated consenting tenants in ascending GUID order from a single VPS over 96 minutes. No evidence of token misuse or post-access activity has been confirmed.
Microsoft Entra ID
15 posts
ConnectWise Cloud Backup application abused in cross-tenant token sweep Enumerating Users and MFA via Microsoft's Password Reset Portal Microsoft's Self-Service Password Reset portal leaks user existence, registered MFA methods, and admin account status without authentication, enabling targeted phishing and password attacks. The public SSPR portal at passwordreset.microsoftonline.com discloses account existence, registered authentication methods, and admin role status via differences in HTTP responses. Attackers can enumerate valid users, identify weak or missing MFA, and prioritize privileged accounts for targeted phishing or password spraying.
TrustSink: How a Rogue External MFA Provider Steals Passwords TrustSink registers a rogue External Authentication Method in Microsoft Entra to capture plaintext passwords during legitimate MFA flows, persisting through password resets. A privileged attacker registers a rogue OpenID Connect provider as an External Authentication Method in Entra. During MFA, the provider shows a fake Microsoft password page, captures the plaintext password, and returns a signed JWT to complete sign-in. The provider persists across password resets, harvesting replacement credentials on subsequent logins.
A Tale of Two SOCs: Insights From Two Red Team Assessments (2026-08-25) CISA conducted simultaneous red team assessments at two critical infrastructure organizations using similar tradecraft. The red team achieved full domain compromise at both organizations by exploiting ADCS misconfigurations, excessive Machine Account Quota settings, cleartext credentials, and overly permissive Entra ID application permissions. Organization A failed to detect the activity due to untuned EDR alerts and organizational silos, while Organization B rapidly triaged and isolated compromised systems. Both organizations lacked Conditional Access policies for workload identities and mature processes for revoking compromised cloud tokens.
WS-Trust Autologon Endpoint: Password Spray Without Smart Lockout Blocking The WS-Trust usernamemixed endpoint behind Entra Seamless SSO accepts direct SOAP-based username and password authentication requests from the internet and processes them through a non-interactive legacy path. This path does not trigger Smart Lockout, does not populate standard Entra ID sign-in logs, and returns AADSTS error codes that distinguish invalid passwords from valid passwords blocked by MFA, Conditional Access, or expiration, allowing an attacker to confirm credential validity on MFA-protected accounts while evading standard detection controls.
The ‘Ghost’ in the Database: Recovering Active ADFS Signing Keys via Machine DPAPI Mandiant discovered that ADFS environments with AutoCertificateRollover disabled and manually rotated certificates can expose active token-signing private keys in Machine DPAPI storage, creating a 'ghost certificate' drift condition where the WID database contains stale entries. A SYSTEM-level attacker can recover the active signing key from the machine CAPI key store using the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret and machine masterkeys, bypassing LSASS and ADFS process monitoring. The recovered key enables forging valid SAML assertions for any user, including Global Administrator, which Entra ID accepts as legitimate authentication.
It Took Five Minutes to Turn a Standard User Into a Global Admin Huntress demonstrated that a standard Microsoft 365 user with no admin privileges can be escalated to Global Administrator in under six minutes by exploiting common identity misconfigurations — specifically, an over-privileged service account owning an enterprise application, lack of MFA enforcement, and standard users being permitted to access the Azure portal. Analysis of 12,000+ M365 tenants revealed that over 60% were missing at least half of recommended security controls, with MFA gaps, over-privileged accounts, and admin restriction failures being the most prevalent issues. The article argues that continuous, automated identity posture management is essential because configuration drift creates exploitable windows far shorter than the 24-hour scan cycles of traditional tools.
Azure AD Graph Activity Logs: Ingestion and threat detection to close the visibility gap Microsoft has introduced customer-accessible logging for the legacy Azure AD Graph API (graph.windows.net), closing a significant visibility gap historically abused by adversary enumeration tools like ROADrecon and AADInternals. Defenders can now ingest AzureADGraphActivityLogs into their SIEM to detect bulk directory reconnaissance, suspicious user agents, and internal API misuse.
Detecting Tycoon 2FA AiTM attacks across Entra ID and Google Workspace Tycoon 2FA is a prolific Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform utilizing Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) techniques to bypass MFA and steal session tokens across Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace. The kit employs sophisticated evasion tactics, automated post-compromise reconnaissance, and establishes durable persistence mechanisms, such as Device-PRT in Entra ID, which survive standard session revocation procedures.
Paved With Intent: ROADtools and Nation-State Tactics in the Cloud ROADtools is an open-source Python framework designed for Entra ID exploration that has been co-opted by nation-state threat actors like APT29 and APT33. Attackers leverage its modules to conduct extensive directory reconnaissance, register rogue devices for persistence, and manipulate OAuth tokens to bypass interactive authentication controls such as MFA. Detection relies on identifying anomalous Microsoft Graph API queries, unusual user-agent strings, and default device registration artifacts.
Feeding Frenzy: RCE on Azure Cosmos for PostgreSQL Varonis Threat Labs identified a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in Azure Cosmos for PostgreSQL caused by improper input validation of the loglineprefix parameter within the Azure management API. By utilizing form feed and newline characters, attackers could bypass single-quote restrictions to inject arbitrary PostgreSQL configurations, such as archive_command, ultimately leading to arbitrary OS command execution on the underlying managed database node.
The "Success" Illusion: How Cross-Tenant ROPC Can Gaslight Your SOC and Poison Data A nuance in the Entra ID Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) protocol allows attackers with compromised credentials to authenticate against a permissive external tenant, generating a 'Sign-in: Success' log in the victim's home tenant. While this cross-tenant authentication does not grant access to the victim's data, it effectively poisons UEBA models and floods the SOC with false positive alerts, creating significant operational disruption and compromising log integrity.
How Unified EDR and ITDR Stop Attacks Before They Spread Huntress details the operational benefits of unifying EDR and ITDR to combat infostealers and rapid credential abuse. A highlighted incident demonstrates a ClickFix social engineering attack leveraging WebDAV and rundll32.exe to execute a remote payload, which was mitigated by automatically isolating the host and revoking associated Microsoft 365 identity sessions.
OpenClaw, Rogue Agents, and Application Hygiene The rapid adoption of AI agents like OpenClaw has introduced a new identity threat surface in Microsoft cloud environments. These applications are often granted sweeping tenant-wide permissions, effectively acting as highly privileged service principals that bypass traditional endpoint defenses and could allow attackers to inherit administrative control if the agent is compromised.
From Misconfigured Spring Boot Actuator to SharePoint Exfiltration: How Stolen Credentials Bypass MFA Threat actors exploited an exposed Spring Boot Actuator endpoint and plaintext credentials found in a spreadsheet to authenticate via the legacy ROPC flow. This allowed them to bypass MFA, obtain a Microsoft Graph access token, and exfiltrate sensitive data from SharePoint Online without deploying malware.