Miasma

2026-07-1413 minSockethigh

Socket's Threat Research Team identified four compromised npm packages in the @asyncapi namespace delivering a multi-stage botnet loader called Miasma. The attack injects obfuscated JavaScript into package source files that executes at module load time (bypassing npm lifecycle script blocking), spawns a detached Node.js process to download an encrypted payload from IPFS, and deploys a 3+ MB tasking framework with multi-channel C2 capabilities including HTTP, Nostr, IPFS, and Ethereum RPC. The malicious packages were published via GitHub Actions trusted publishing from a compromised source commit on the 'next' branch.

2026-07-0216 minSocketcritical

A new wave of the Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma/Hades supply chain attack campaign has compromised 23 npm packages across the LeoPlatform and RStreams ecosystems, plus the Verana Blockchain Go module. The attack uses binding.gyp install-time execution (Phantom Gyp pattern) to trigger multi-stage obfuscated JavaScript loaders that decrypt AES-GCM payloads, stage execution through Bun to evade Node.js security hooks, and steal developer/CI/CD credentials including npm, GitHub, cloud, and AI-agent tokens. The campaign also poisons GitHub Actions workflows and plants persistence hooks in AI coding assistant configurations, creating delayed execution surfaces that survive package remediation.

2026-07-0117 minSockethigh

The Miasma Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain campaign has expanded to compromise 22 npm package versions under the @immobiliarelabs scope, targeting Backstage plugins for GitLab integration and LDAP authentication. The malicious packages use a binding.gyp 'Phantom Gyp' trick to execute hidden root-level index.js payloads without preinstall/postinstall hooks, followed by AES-128-GCM decryption and multi-stage delivery under the Bun runtime. The final payload exfiltrates developer and CI/CD secrets via the GitHub API to attacker-controlled repositories, and the campaign likely propagated through a compromised codfish/semantic-release-action GitHub Action that enabled access to release automation credentials.

2026-06-097 minSockethigh

A fast-moving supply chain campaign dubbed Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma is targeting Python developers via malicious PyPI wheels. The threat actors are utilizing novel execution techniques, including trojanized native extensions and split-loader .pth hooks that search sys.path for payloads, to deploy the Hades stealer and harvest credentials from CI/CD pipelines and developer workstations.

2026-06-085 minMorphiseccritical

The third wave of the Shai-Hulud supply chain worm, dubbed Miasma, targets the npm ecosystem by utilizing weaponized binding.gyp files to bypass lifecycle script monitoring. It establishes deep persistence within AI assistant and IDE configuration directories, evades detection through dormancy and EDR checks, and abuses valid Sigstore attestations to masquerade as legitimate packages.

Trojanized Build Pipelines and Blind-Spot Appliances Redefine the Perimeter Attackers are bypassing traditional network defenses by compromising the tools developers use to build software and the AI assistants they rely on to write code. Campaigns like Mini Shai-Hulud and Miasma - The Spreading Blight flooded package registries with malicious code that steals cloud credentials and CI/CD tokens, while researchers proved that public AI agent skill marketplaces are completely ineffective at catching malicious add-ons. Nation-state actors and cybercriminals are simultaneously shifting their focus to blind spots in corporate networks and trusted platforms. The VerdantBamboo group exploited firewalls to bypass conditional access, while UNC3753 used IT impersonation to trick law firm employees into installing remote access tools, and Kali365 expanded its phishing infrastructure to steal multi-factor authentication tokens. Defenders must shift their focus from perimeter email filtering to securing the software build pipeline and monitoring edge appliances for anomalous traffic. Hunt for unexpected connections to cloud storage APIs and review developer environments for compromised packages or AI skills.

2026-06-077 minSocketcritical

A coordinated supply chain attack compromised 19 PyPI packages, utilizing malicious .pth files to achieve execution at Python startup. The loader downloads the Bun runtime to execute an obfuscated JavaScript stealer targeting developer secrets, cloud credentials, and CI/CD tokens, exfiltrating data via GitHub repositories and Actions.

A highly coordinated supply chain attack compromised 56 npm packages across 286 versions by abusing the binding.gyp native build configuration to silently execute malicious code during installation. The multi-stage, heavily encrypted payload targets CI/CD environments to harvest cloud credentials, propagates via stolen OIDC tokens, and establishes persistence with a destructive dead man's switch.