An Initial Access Broker is exploiting CVE-2025-5777 (CitrixBleed 2), a pre-authentication memory overread in Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway, to steal session tokens and bypass MFA. The stolen sessions are used to access Citrix published desktops, followed by a consistent privilege escalation via a registry symbolic-link LPE tool that abuses the Windows AppMgmt service and Group Policy refresh to gain SYSTEM. The operator then creates backdoor admin accounts, installs rogue ScreenConnect/Zoho Assist RMM clients, moves laterally with PsExec and Impacket, and ultimately deploys DragonForce ransomware. The full kill chain from initial access to encryption was observed completing in under one hour in at least one case.
CVE-2025-5777
2 posts
Seven Steps to Ransomware: CitrixBleed 2 Weaponized by Initial Access Brokers From CitrixBleed 2 to Cloudflared: The Tools and Techniques Behind Anubis Ransomware Attacks Arctic Wolf Labs documents Anubis ransomware affiliate tradecraft observed across multiple 2026 intrusions, featuring CitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777) exploitation and valid VPN credential abuse for initial access. Affiliates consistently deploy legitimate RMM tools for persistence, use Mimikatz and ntds.dit extraction for credential access, establish alternate egress via cloudflared and SSH SOCKS tunnels, and employ exfiltration tools like S3 Browser and rclone before deploying encryptors on Windows and Linux systems. The attack chain relies on commodity tools and living-off-the-land techniques that resemble legitimate administration in isolation but form a distinctive kill chain when correlated.