Researchers identified a universal bucket hijacking technique affecting major cloud providers (AWS, GCP, Azure) that allows attackers to silently exfiltrate data streams. By exploiting the global uniqueness of bucket names, an attacker with deletion privileges can delete a target bucket and recreate it in their own environment, seamlessly rerouting logs, backups, and messages without requiring granular configuration update permissions.
Cloud Security
15 posts
The Global Namespace Risk: Universal Bucket Hijacking Technique for Cloud Data Exfiltration Azure AD Graph Activity Logs: Ingestion and threat detection to close the visibility gap Microsoft has introduced customer-accessible logging for the legacy Azure AD Graph API (graph.windows.net), closing a significant visibility gap historically abused by adversary enumeration tools like ROADrecon and AADInternals. Defenders can now ingest AzureADGraphActivityLogs into their SIEM to detect bulk directory reconnaissance, suspicious user agents, and internal API misuse.
MyBait: Why We Lured Attackers To Encrypt Our Cloud MySQL Varonis Threat Labs deployed managed MySQL honeypots across major cloud providers to observe attacker behavior. The publicly exposed GCP instance with weak credentials was compromised within hours by multiple automated ransomware operators who brute-forced access, exfiltrated data, dropped tables, and left ransom notes.
Blinding the Watchmen: Abusing Cloud Logging Services for Defense Evasion and Visibility Threat actors are increasingly targeting cloud logging services like AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Logging to evade detection and maintain persistence. By manipulating log routing, deleting storage destinations, or impairing encryption keys, attackers can blind security operations and operate undetected. Furthermore, attackers can redirect log flows to attacker-controlled infrastructure to gain continuous visibility into the victim's cloud environment.
Paved With Intent: ROADtools and Nation-State Tactics in the Cloud ROADtools is an open-source Python framework designed for Entra ID exploration that has been co-opted by nation-state threat actors like APT29 and APT33. Attackers leverage its modules to conduct extensive directory reconnaissance, register rogue devices for persistence, and manipulate OAuth tokens to bypass interactive authentication controls such as MFA. Detection relies on identifying anomalous Microsoft Graph API queries, unusual user-agent strings, and default device registration artifacts.
19 Cloud Security Challenges and How to Mitigate Risk The article outlines 19 critical cloud security challenges facing organizations, emphasizing that misconfigurations, weak identity and access management (IAM), and human error are the primary drivers of cloud compromise. It highlights emerging threats such as AI-powered deepfake social engineering, MFA fatigue, and cloud-targeted extortion, underscoring the need for unified visibility and robust configuration management.
Feeding Frenzy: RCE on Azure Cosmos for PostgreSQL Varonis Threat Labs identified a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in Azure Cosmos for PostgreSQL caused by improper input validation of the loglineprefix parameter within the Azure management API. By utilizing form feed and newline characters, attackers could bypass single-quote restrictions to inject arbitrary PostgreSQL configurations, such as archive_command, ultimately leading to arbitrary OS command execution on the underlying managed database node.
“Legitimate” phishing: how attackers weaponize Amazon SES to bypass email security Attackers are weaponizing Amazon Simple Email Service (SES) using compromised AWS IAM keys to launch highly convincing phishing and Business Email Compromise (BEC) campaigns. Because the emails originate from legitimate Amazon infrastructure, they successfully pass standard authentication protocols like SPF, DKIM, and DMARC, making detection difficult without disrupting legitimate business workflows.
Can AI Attack the Cloud? Lessons From Building an Autonomous Cloud Offensive Multi-Agent System Unit 42 developed a multi-agent AI proof-of-concept named Zealot to empirically test autonomous offensive capabilities in cloud environments. The PoC successfully demonstrated that AI can autonomously chain reconnaissance, SSRF exploitation, IAM privilege escalation, and data exfiltration at machine speed against a misconfigured GCP environment.
Cracks in the Bedrock: Agent God Mode The AWS Bedrock AgentCore starter toolkit automatically provisions overly permissive IAM roles that grant wildcard access across the AWS account. This "Agent God Mode" misconfiguration allows a compromised AI agent to exfiltrate ECR images, access other agents' memories, and escalate privileges by invoking other code interpreters or agents.
Elastic Security Integrations Roundup: Q1 2026 Elastic has released nine new third-party integrations for Q1 2026, enhancing visibility across macOS, cloud environments, email security, and SIEM platforms. These integrations provide out-of-the-box data normalization, prebuilt dashboards, and AI-driven analysis capabilities to streamline security operations and threat detection.
Digital Transformation in Africa: Security, Scale, and Control This article is a high-level overview of digital transformation trends in Africa, focusing on the need for secure, scalable, and flexible cloud architectures. It highlights Akamai's solutions and upcoming presence at GITEX AFRICA 2026, containing no specific threat intelligence or technical indicators.
CrowdStrike 2026 Global Threat Report: The Evasive Adversary Wields AI The CrowdStrike 2026 Global Threat Report highlights a shift toward highly evasive, malware-free attacks leveraging valid credentials, AI tools, and supply chain compromises. Adversaries are operating with unprecedented speed, with average breakout times dropping to 29 minutes, while increasingly targeting AI infrastructure, cloud environments, and network edge devices.
From Seconds to Story: How Huntress Managed ITDR's New Incident Report Timeline Changes Response Huntress has introduced a new Incident Report Timeline feature for its Managed ITDR platform to combat rapid, identity-driven data exfiltration in cloud environments. This feature provides a chronological narrative of attacker actions and response efforts, enabling faster decision-making and better communication for security teams and MSPs.
The Agentic Security Crisis: Why You Need to Act Now The proliferation of autonomous AI agents like OpenClaw has introduced severe security risks, including unauthorized data access and silent exfiltration via prompt injection and malicious plug-ins. To mitigate these threats, organizations must transition from local agent deployments to hardened, isolated cloud environments utilizing defense-in-depth strategies such as kernel-level eBPF monitoring and runtime prompt interception.
