GitHub experienced an internal security incident where threat actor TeamPCP (UNC6780) compromised an employee's device using a malicious Visual Studio Code extension. The attacker harvested local developer secrets to clone approximately 3,800 internal repositories, which were subsequently listed for sale on a cybercrime forum.
CanisterWorm
4 posts
GitHub internal repositories breached Namastex.ai npm Packages Hit with TeamPCP-Style CanisterWorm Malware A supply chain attack targeting npm packages associated with Namastex.ai has been discovered, utilizing CanisterWorm-style malware. The malicious packages execute upon installation to harvest developer credentials, cloud secrets, and cryptocurrency wallets, exfiltrating data to an ICP canister and webhooks while attempting to self-propagate across the npm and PyPI ecosystems.
TeamPCP Is Systematically Targeting Security Tools Across the OSS Ecosystem The threat actor TeamPCP is conducting a highly coordinated supply chain campaign targeting widely used open-source security tools and developer infrastructure, including Trivy, Checkmarx' KICS, and LiteLLM. By compromising CI/CD pipelines and GitHub Actions, the attackers are successfully turning trusted security scanners into infostealers to harvest and exfiltrate massive amounts of enterprise credentials.
CanisterWorm: npm Publisher Compromise Deploys Backdoor Across 29+ Packages CanisterWorm is a worm-enabled supply chain attack that compromises legitimate npm publisher accounts to distribute a Python backdoor. The malware establishes user-level Linux persistence via systemd and utilizes an Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) canister as a dead-drop C2 to continuously fetch and execute secondary payloads, while simultaneously harvesting npm tokens to propagate itself to other packages.
