Akamai's SOTI Security report details how agentic AI is reshaping the threat landscape for commerce, with a 19% YoY increase in AI bot traffic and over 200 billion application/API attacks between 2024 and 2025. Attackers are exploiting consumer-facing chatbots through logic manipulation, back-end AI agents via prompt injection, and public AI endpoints for token freeloading. The retail vertical bore the brunt of Layer 7 DDoS activity (84%), with hacktivist groups like 313 Team leveraging Mirai-derived IoT botnets and browser impersonation for multi-vector attacks.
api-abuse
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Smash and Grab at Scale: Agentic AI Is Reshaping the Threat to Commerce Compromised npm Packages in the AsyncAPI Namespace Deliver Miasma Botnet Loader Socket's Threat Research Team identified four compromised npm packages in the @asyncapi namespace delivering a multi-stage botnet loader called Miasma. The attack injects obfuscated JavaScript into package source files that executes at module load time (bypassing npm lifecycle script blocking), spawns a detached Node.js process to download an encrypted payload from IPFS, and deploys a 3+ MB tasking framework with multi-channel C2 capabilities including HTTP, Nostr, IPFS, and Ethereum RPC. The malicious packages were published via GitHub Actions trusted publishing from a compromised source commit on the 'next' branch.
Malicious GitHub Campaign: Fake “Arctic Wolf” and 290+ Brand-Impersonation Repositories Deliver BoryptGrab-Lineage Infostealer An unattributed, financially motivated threat actor has operated at least 292 brand-impersonation GitHub repositories since 26 June 2026 to distribute a BoryptGrab-lineage Windows infostealer. The delivery chain abuses GitHub trust by routing users through *.github.io redirectors to actor-controlled download pages that serve ZIP archives containing a legitimate signed WinGUP updater (gup.exe) that side-loads a trojanized libcurl.dll, which reflectively executes an 11-module in-memory stealer. The stealer bypasses Chrome App-Bound Encryption v20 via in-process reflective DLL injection into the browser process, scans Steam process memory for live session tokens, harvests credentials from 19+ browsers and 41 cryptocurrency wallet paths, and exfiltrates all data via raw-socket chunked POST to a hardcoded C2 at 193.143.1.131 in Russia.
Malicious Go Module Exposes GitHub Malware Lure Network Spanning 222 Repositories Operation Muck and Load is a supply chain attack campaign centered on a malicious Go module that impersonates a DNS scanner tool to deliver a multi-stage Windows malware loader. The campaign leverages 222 GitHub lure repositories across 190 accounts with automated commit-farming workflows to create false credibility, and uses public dead-drop resolvers across multiple platforms for resilient payload-location resolution. The final payload chain delivers AsyncRAT, Quasar, Remcos, Vidar infostealer, and cryptominers through password-protected 7z archives extracted into masqueraded Microsoft-themed directories.
- 8 minWeekly Recap — 2026-06-29 -> 2026-07-06
Token Theft and AI Poisoning Redefine the Perimeter Attackers are shifting from breaking passwords to stealing active login sessions, bypassing multi-factor authentication entirely. This week, ARToken and ConsentFix exploited Microsoft 365 OAuth flows to hijack accounts, while Anubis ransomware used the ongoing CitrixBleed 2 vulnerability to steal session tokens from network gateways. Even a standard user can become a Global Administrator in minutes if identity settings are loose, as demonstrated by a recent M365 privilege escalation analysis. Simultaneously, artificial intelligence systems have evolved from helper tools to critical vulnerabilities, serving as both the weapon and the target. Threat actors are using AI to generate malware like InfernoGrabber v9.0 and BusySnake Stealer, while also poisoning AI agent ecosystems with malicious skills like OpenClaw and tricking AI models into executing financial fraud via indirect prompt injection. The AI arms race has accelerated breakout times to under 30 minutes, with state-sponsored groups like GTG-1002 now orchestrating entire espionage campaigns via AI. Defenders must immediately audit identity and session controls, treating session tokens as highly sensitive credentials. Security teams should also implement guardrails for AI agents, verifying external URLs and restricting autonomous financial or code execution actions.
Gamaredon in 2025: Leveraging tunnels, workers, dead drops, and new alliances Gamaredon, a Russia-aligned APT group attributed to the FSB, maintained high operational tempo throughout 2025 with 35 spearphishing campaigns exclusively targeting Ukrainian government and military institutions. The group introduced six new PowerShell tools, resurrected the PteroSetup VBScript weaponizer for lateral movement, and began abusing CVE-2025-8088 (WinRAR) for persistence via the Startup folder. A significant infrastructure evolution occurred: C&C servers are now hidden behind tunnel services (Cloudflare tunnels, Cloudflare workers, Microsoft devtunnels, Loophole) and dead-drop resolutions on legitimate platforms (Telegram, Telegra.ph, Rentry, GoFile, Dropbox, and others), while stolen data is exfiltrated to S3-compatible cloud storage (Wasabi, Tebi, Intercolo) rather than attacker-owned servers.
- 19 minMonthly Recap — 2026-06-01 -> 2026-07-01
AI Attacked and Abused While Perimeter Authentication Collapses The month's defining shift was the emergence of AI as a two-sided battlefield: organizations deployed AI tools faster than they secured them, while attackers weaponized the same technology against defenders. Critical flaws in LangGraph allowed SQL injection chained to remote code execution, M365 Copilot could be turned into a one-click data exfiltration weapon via SearchLeak, and Langflow was exploited to deploy cryptominers. Meanwhile, the ongoing Shai-Hulud campaign injected prompts to blind AI malware scanners, macOS.Gaslight turned prompt injection against human analysts, and Russia's APT28 began experimenting with LLM-integrated malware. At the same time, perimeter authentication collapsed at scale: FortiBleed exposed credentials for over 73,000 FortiGate firewalls, CVE-2026-50751 let attackers bypass Check Point VPN authentication entirely, and ShinyHunters exploited an Oracle PeopleSoft zero-day across over 100 organizations. Supply chain attackers followed developers to their new AI tools, compromising the ecosystems where code is written and built. The Shai-Hulud/Miasma worm expanded from npm into PyPI and injected persistent backdoors into AI coding assistant configurations, while North Korea's Sapphire Sleet compromised over 140 Mastra npm packages to steal cryptocurrency wallets, and the ongoing GlassWorm campaign pivoted to WebAssembly malware in VS Code extensions using the Solana blockchain as command-and-control. Social engineering also industrialized: the ErrTraffic framework turned ClickFix deception into a Malware-as-a-Service operation with blockchain dead drops, and EvilTokens hid phishing flows inside browser-side encryption to defeat network scanners while hijacking Microsoft device-code authentication. Organizations should treat AI deployments as untrusted perimeter assets—restrict their network access, audit third-party skills and extensions, and assume prompt-injection attacks will target both automated scanners and human analysts. Every internet-facing VPN, firewall, and edge appliance should be patched immediately, with credentials rotated and phishing-resistant MFA enforced, because perimeter authentication failures now cascade directly into internal network compromise.
OpenClaw’s Skill Marketplace and the Emerging AI Supply Chain Threat Threat actors are exploiting the OpenClaw AI agent ecosystem by publishing malicious skills on the ClawHub marketplace. These skills leverage semantic instruction hijacking to bypass traditional security controls, delivering macOS infostealers via base64-encoded droppers, utilizing massive file padding for defense evasion, and executing novel agentic financial fraud schemes like runtime affiliate injection and front-running.
EvilTokens: How “Ghost” Code Threatens US and European Businesses The EvilTokens phishing kit utilizes browser-side AES-GCM decryption to conceal its malicious payload from static analysis tools. By abusing the Microsoft Device Code authentication flow, the kit tricks victims into authorizing attacker access to their Microsoft 365 accounts without directly harvesting credentials, creating a significant visibility gap for SOC teams.
- 12 minWeekly Recap — 2026-06-15 -> 2026-06-22
Trust Chains Broken at Scale While ClickFix Becomes a Service This week, attackers stopped trying to kick down the front door and instead walked in through the trust chains that hold digital ecosystems together. North Korea's Sapphire Sleet compromised over 140 Mastra npm packages through a single typosquatted dependency, stealing cryptocurrency wallets and planting persistent backdoors on developer machines. The GlassWorm group trojanized Open VSX extensions with WebAssembly malware that uses the Solana blockchain as an unkillable command channel, while SmartApeSG hijacked the Okendo Reviews widget to serve malicious prompts on thousands of e-commerce sites. Even vendor integrations became a liability: the Klue breach exposed Recorded Future client data through a compromised OAuth token connecting a marketing tool to Salesforce. Deception also became an industrial product. The ErrTraffic framework now operates as full Malware-as-a-Service, using blockchain smart contracts to hide its infrastructure and compromised WordPress sites to serve fake error prompts that trick users into running malicious commands. Attackers weaponized trusted AI platforms too—one campaign abused claude.ai's shared chat feature to deliver MacSync infostealer on macOS, while the shai_hulululud npm package uses prompt injection to blind AI-powered security scanners. On the infrastructure side, the FortiBleed campaign cracked credentials for over 73,000 FortiGate firewalls with a 45-GPU cluster, handing attackers valid keys to government and defense networks worldwide. Defenders should immediately hunt for the easy-day-js dependency in their npm projects, reset credentials on any FortiGate firewall, enable Azure AD Graph Activity Logs to close a years-long reconnaissance visibility gap in Microsoft cloud environments, and audit OAuth tokens on all third-party vendor integrations.
Azure AD Graph Activity Logs: Ingestion and threat detection to close the visibility gap Microsoft has introduced customer-accessible logging for the legacy Azure AD Graph API (graph.windows.net), closing a significant visibility gap historically abused by adversary enumeration tools like ROADrecon and AADInternals. Defenders can now ingest AzureADGraphActivityLogs into their SIEM to detect bulk directory reconnaissance, suspicious user agents, and internal API misuse.
How Akamai Defended an Indian Bank Against Record-Breaking DDoS Attacks In May 2026, a major Indian public sector bank was targeted by sophisticated, multi-vector DDoS attacks peaking at 1.78 Tbps and 171 Mpps. The attackers aimed to overwhelm network bandwidth and compute resources by targeting a critical login endpoint using globally distributed infrastructure. The attacks were successfully mitigated at the edge using preconfigured protections and continuous traffic profiling, resulting in no service disruption.
Public and Private Medical Community Targeted by China-Nexus Threat Actor Pursuing Artificial Intelligence, Cyber, Medical, and National Defense Research Google Threat Intelligence Group identified a PRC-nexus espionage campaign by UNC6508 targeting North American research and defense entities. The actors compromised REDCap servers to deploy INFINITERED, a custom malware that harvests credentials and intercepts software upgrades for persistence. Using stolen credentials, the attackers pivoted to administrative accounts and abused email content compliance rules to covertly exfiltrate sensitive intelligence.
- 7 minWeekly Recap — 2026-06-08 -> 2026-06-15
Perimeter Auth Collapse and AI-Driven Deception Shift the Battlefield The security perimeter cracked open this week as critical authentication bypasses in Check Point VPNs, Ivanti Sentry, and Palo Alto GlobalProtect gave attackers a free pass into corporate networks, with Qilin ransomware already exploiting one to launch real attacks. At the same time, AI became the year's most versatile weapon: criminals used ChatGPT and Claude brands as phishing lures, researchers proved AI email assistants will hand over corporate secrets to impersonators, and the Shai-Hulud campaign began injecting fake prompts to blind AI-powered security scanners. Patch edge VPN appliances immediately, treat AI agents as high-risk insiders, and hunt for device-code authentication events that bypass normal credential checks.
Shai-Hulud: Miasma, Hades, & AI Scanner Evasion | ThreatLabz The Shai-Hulud software supply chain campaign has significantly evolved, expanding from npm to PyPI and shifting from maintainer compromise to CI/CD abuse. Recent waves demonstrate advanced techniques including OIDC token scraping to bypass SLSA provenance, IDE configuration file weaponization, and prompt injection designed to evade LLM-based security scanners.
From SQLi to RCE – Exploiting LangGraph’s Checkpointer Check Point Research discovered critical vulnerabilities in LangGraph's SQLite and Redis checkpointers that allow attackers to chain SQL injection with unsafe msgpack deserialization to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE). The flaws occur when user-controlled input is passed to the getstatehistory() filter, enabling attackers to inject malicious serialized payloads that execute arbitrary OS commands upon deserialization.
Trust No Skill: Integrity Verification for AI Agent Supply Chains The article introduces Behavioral Integrity Verification (BIV) to audit third-party skills for AI agents by comparing declared metadata against actual executable code and natural-language instructions. Analysis of the OpenClaw registry found that while most deviations are benign documentation errors, a critical 5% of skills contain multi-stage attack chains such as silent credential exfiltration and instruction-override hijacking.
Q1 2026 Cyber Risk Report: Insights from 2.1 Million Malware and Phishing Investigations ANY.RUN's Q1 2026 Cyber Risk Report highlights a significant acceleration in attacker operational tempo, with the median time-to-persistence dropping to 21 seconds and LOTL execution occurring in 16 seconds. The data also shows a marked increase in loader-based attacks, credential theft, and the weaponization of trusted tools via JavaScript LOLBAS techniques, emphasizing the critical need for rapid, behavior-based detection capabilities.
Containers on fire: from container escapes to supply chain attacks This report details primary attack vectors against containerized environments, focusing on container escapes, orchestration API abuse, and supply chain compromises. Threat actors exploit misconfigurations such as excessive Linux capabilities and exposed Docker sockets to break out of containers, while also targeting CI/CD pipelines and public image repositories to establish initial footholds.
FortiClient EMS Exploited via CVE-2026-35616 to Deliver EKZ Infostealer Disguised as a Fortinet Patch Threat actors exploited CVE-2026-35616, an improper access control vulnerability in FortiClient EMS, to deploy a novel credential stealer named EKZ Infostealer to managed endpoints. The attackers abused legitimate VPN scripting workflows to execute malicious PowerShell commands that downloaded the stealer, which subsequently harvested browser credentials and exfiltrated them to a threat-actor-controlled server.
- 7 minWeekly Recap — 2026-05-18 -> 2026-05-25
Software Supply Chain and AI Exploitation Dominate Threat Landscape The software supply chain has become the primary battlefield for attackers because compromising a single developer tool can cascade into thousands of enterprise networks. Campaigns like Mini Shai-Hulud and TrapDoor are stealing credentials and injecting backdoors across major code registries, while the Laravel Lang Compromise and the Coruna Exploit Kit show how malicious code can automatically execute to steal secrets or exploit end users. As a result, organizations must treat developer environments as high-value targets, because a single compromised package or malicious VS Code extension can lead to catastrophic breaches like the GitHub internal repository theft by TeamPCP. In parallel, artificial intelligence is simultaneously accelerating attacks and creating dangerous new attack surfaces. Threat actors are using AI to automate influence campaigns like Patriot Bait and crack passwords, while also impersonating AI tools like Gemini CLI and Claude Code to deliver infostealers. Furthermore, attackers are directly targeting exposed AI infrastructure, such as Ollama AI endpoints, and manipulating AI coding assistants via hidden prompt injections in campaigns like TrapDoor, which means AI systems are both the weapon and the target. These trends together suggest that traditional perimeter defenses are failing against supply chain and AI-driven threats. Managers should immediately enforce strict vetting of open-source packages, restrict developer access to unverified extensions, and ensure AI infrastructure is not exposed to the public internet.
Decentralized Threat: Stealthy P2P Cryptominer Targeting Ollama Endpoints A sophisticated attack campaign is targeting Ollama AI endpoints to deploy a custom Go-based P2P remote access Trojan (RAT) and cryptominer. The malware, named 'vc', leverages decentralized networking via libp2p to evade traditional C2 blocking and utilizes RAM disk execution and process masquerading to maintain stealth.
GitHub internal repositories breached GitHub experienced an internal security incident where threat actor TeamPCP (UNC6780) compromised an employee's device using a malicious Visual Studio Code extension. The attacker harvested local developer secrets to clone approximately 3,800 internal repositories, which were subsequently listed for sale on a cybercrime forum.
Webworm: New burrowing techniques The China-aligned APT group Webworm has updated its toolset in 2025, shifting focus to European and South African targets. The group deployed two new custom backdoors, EchoCreep and GraphWorm, which abuse Discord and the Microsoft Graph API respectively for command and control. Additionally, Webworm utilizes a complex network of custom proxy tools and compromised infrastructure, including GitHub and Amazon S3, to stage payloads and exfiltrate data.
From PDB strings to MaaS: Tracking a commodity BadIIS ecosystem used by Chinese-speaking threat Cisco Talos has identified a commodity BadIIS malware ecosystem operating under a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model, primarily used by Chinese-speaking threat actors for SEO fraud and traffic manipulation. The developer, known as 'lwxat', provides a dedicated builder and sophisticated service-based installers that ensure persistence on compromised Windows IIS servers while evading detection through custom Base64 encoding and service impersonation.
The time of much patching is coming The Talos Threat Source newsletter highlights an impending surge in software patching driven by AI vulnerability discovery tools. It also contrasts state-sponsored espionage tactics—which leverage valid credentials and native tools to bypass traditional defenses—with commodity ransomware, while summarizing recent supply chain compromises across developer platforms like Hugging Face and Jenkins.
Analyzing TeamPCP’s Supply Chain Attacks: Checkmarx KICS and elementary-data in CI/CD Credential Theft TeamPCP (SHADOW-WATER-058) executed a sophisticated supply chain campaign compromising developer toolchains across multiple ecosystems, including Docker Hub, PyPI, and GitHub Actions. The attacks leveraged CI/CD trust, such as unsanitized PR comments and stolen publisher tokens, to distribute credential-harvesting payloads via Python .pth files and the Bun runtime, targeting over 80 credential types and abusing live AWS APIs.
One Is a Fluke, 3 Is a Pattern: MCP Back-End Vulnerabilities Security researchers discovered critical vulnerabilities in three widely used Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers—Apache Doris, Apache Pinot, and Alibaba RDS—stemming from insufficient back-end security validation. These flaws include SQL injection (CVE-2025-66335), missing authentication, and unauthenticated data exposure, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands or exfiltrate sensitive database metadata.
What Is the Instructure Canvas Breach? Impact, Risks, and What Institutions Should Do In May 2026, threat actor SHADOW-AETHER-015 compromised Instructure's Canvas LMS backend, exposing sensitive data from 8,809 global educational institutions. The breach, likely facilitated via API exploitation or third-party integration compromise, exposed PII and private communications, creating significant risk for highly targeted follow-on spear-phishing and credential abuse campaigns.
Steal Smarter, Not Harder: Malicious use of Vercel for Credential Phishing Threat actors are increasingly leveraging Vercel's GenAI capabilities, specifically v0.dev, to rapidly generate and host highly convincing credential phishing pages. By combining AI-generated frontends with Telegram Bot API integrations for real-time credential exfiltration, attackers can deploy resilient, low-effort phishing infrastructure on legitimate cloud services that evades traditional detection mechanisms.
The Other Side of the MCP Threat Conversation Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers introduce a new attack surface akin to AI-native APIs, exposing organizations to protocol-level attacks, injection vulnerabilities, and authorization bypasses. Because MCP tools often use permissive validation to accommodate LLM inputs and proactively broadcast their capabilities via plain-English descriptions, attackers can easily map business logic and exploit downstream systems or trigger resource exhaustion.
That AI Extension Helping You Write Emails? It’s Reading Them First Unit 42 identified 18 high-risk browser extensions masquerading as GenAI productivity tools that function as remote access Trojans, infostealers, and spyware. These extensions exploit browser permissions to intercept API keys, exfiltrate DOM content, establish persistent WebSocket C2 channels, and dynamically route traffic via malicious proxy configurations.
Silver Fox uses the new ABCDoor backdoor to target organizations in Russia and India The Silver Fox threat group is conducting a phishing campaign targeting organizations in Russia and India with tax-themed lures. The attack chain utilizes a modified RustSL loader featuring geofencing and Phantom Persistence to deploy ValleyRAT. ValleyRAT subsequently downloads a novel Python-based backdoor called ABCDoor, which masquerades as a Tailscale VPN client and provides remote control and screen broadcasting capabilities.
Cyber Centre Daily Advisory Digest — 2026-04-30 (2 advisories) The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security issued a daily digest highlighting recent security advisories for GitLab and GNU InetUtils. Critical vulnerabilities were addressed in GitLab CE/EE (patched in 18.11.2 and 18.10.5) and GNU InetUtils (patched in version 2.8, fixing two CVEs), requiring immediate patching by administrators.
The Industrialization of Exploitation: Why Defensive AI Must Outpace Offensive AI The cybersecurity landscape is experiencing a shift towards industrialized exploitation driven by offensive AI and LLMs. These technologies act as orchestrators that rapidly discover vulnerabilities and generate exploits, necessitating defensive AI and behavioral analytics to counter machine-scale attacks.
GopherWhisper: A burrow full of malware ESET researchers uncovered GopherWhisper, a previously undocumented China-aligned APT group targeting a Mongolian governmental entity. The group utilizes a diverse arsenal of custom, primarily Go-based malware that leverages legitimate services like Slack, Discord, and Microsoft Outlook for command and control, blending malicious traffic with normal enterprise communications.
Can AI Attack the Cloud? Lessons From Building an Autonomous Cloud Offensive Multi-Agent System Unit 42 developed a multi-agent AI proof-of-concept named Zealot to empirically test autonomous offensive capabilities in cloud environments. The PoC successfully demonstrated that AI can autonomously chain reconnaissance, SSRF exploitation, IAM privilege escalation, and data exfiltration at machine speed against a misconfigured GCP environment.
Your Staging Site Is More Important than You Think A third-party security researcher discovered a vulnerability in a staging environment via Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) probing. The incident underscores the critical importance of applying production-level security monitoring, access controls, and incident response capabilities to non-production environments to prevent them from becoming initial access vectors.
Microsoft Releases Open Source Toolkit for AI Agent Runtime Security Microsoft has released the open-source Agent Governance Toolkit to address the growing security risks associated with autonomous AI agents. The toolkit provides runtime policy enforcement, cryptographic identity, and execution sandboxing to mitigate threats outlined in the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, though challenges in credential scoping and semantic intent classification remain.
EvilTokens: an AI-augmented Phishing-as-a-Service for automating BEC fraud – Part 2 EvilTokens is an advanced Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform that automates Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks via Microsoft device code phishing. It uniquely integrates AI models to automatically analyze compromised mailboxes, identify financial targets, and generate context-aware BEC lures, significantly reducing the time and skill required for threat actors to monetize compromised accounts.
Major Cyber Attacks in March 2026: OAuth Phishing, SVG Smuggling, Magecart, and More March 2026 saw a surge in sophisticated, multi-stage cyber attacks designed to evade early detection. Key threats included OAuth device code phishing (EvilTokens) for M365 account takeover, registry-hidden RAT staging (RUTSSTAGER), macOS backdoors delivered via ClickFix lures, and resilient botnets utilizing Dead Drop Resolvers.
Double Agents: Exposing Security Blind Spots in GCP Vertex AI Unit 42 researchers discovered that malicious AI agents deployed in GCP Vertex AI could exploit default permission scoping to extract service agent credentials. This 'double agent' attack allows unauthorized access to consumer storage buckets, restricted Google internal infrastructure, and introduces risks of remote code execution via insecure pickle deserialization.
Varonis Discovers Local File Inclusion in AWS Remote MCP Server via CLI Shorthand Syntax Varonis Threat Labs identified a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability (CVE-2026-4270) in the AWS Remote MCP Server that allows authenticated users to read arbitrary files. By exploiting the AWS CLI shorthand file-loading syntax via the aws___call_aws tool, attackers can bypass access restrictions and extract sensitive file contents through error messages.
The AI Malware Surge: Behavior, Attribution, and Defensive Readiness AI-assisted malware development has rapidly matured, driven largely by the adoption of models like DeepSeek R1, which lowers the barrier to entry for threat actors. This surge has resulted in a high volume of structurally novel malware, including infostealers, RATs, and ransomware, many of which evade traditional signature-based detection while leaving distinct LLM-generated artifacts in their code.
NICKEL ALLEY strategy: Fake it ‘til you make it North Korean threat group NICKEL ALLEY is targeting technology professionals and Web3 developers through fake job interviews and malicious code repositories. The group employs social engineering, the ClickFix tactic, and malicious VS Code tasks to deliver remote access trojans like PyLangGhost RAT and BeaverTail, primarily aiming for cryptocurrency theft and potential supply chain compromise.
RSAC 2026: Tag in a Partner for the AI Security Showdown This promotional article highlights Akamai's upcoming presence at RSAC 2026, focusing on the escalating arms race between AI-driven cyber threats and enterprise security. It emphasizes that adversaries are using AI to automate API attacks and exploit cloud misconfigurations, necessitating a shift away from legacy security toward robust Zero Trust frameworks and strategic partner ecosystems.
- 6 minWeekly Recap — 2026-04-27 -> 2026-05-04
AI Weaponization and Developer Supply Chain Attacks Redefine the Perimeter Attackers are aggressively targeting the software development process because compromising a single developer tool can unlock thousands of corporate networks. In parallel, artificial intelligence is collapsing the cost of attacks, allowing criminals to build convincing deepfakes and automated phishing campaigns in minutes. As a result, traditional security like multi-factor authentication is increasingly bypassed using tricks that steal active login sessions rather than passwords. These trends together suggest that relying on perimeter defenses and basic hygiene is no longer enough, as attackers hide inside trusted cloud services and legitimate software updates. This matters because organizations are losing visibility into where their sensitive data actually lives, especially as AI tools create hidden pathways into company systems. Defenders must shift their focus to monitoring user behavior after login and securing the automated systems that build their software. Watch for unusual activity in your developer tools and implement stricter checks on third-party software.
- 7 minMonthly Recap — 2026-04-01 -> 2026-05-01
AI Weaponization Collapses Trust as Identity Becomes the Perimeter Attackers are using artificial intelligence to make phishing and social engineering dramatically cheaper and more convincing, as seen in BlueNoroff's AI-generated deepfake meetings targeting Web3 executives and the Bluekit phishing platform's built-in AI assistant that crafts lures on demand. Because these AI tools can generate convincing scams and steal session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication, traditional email filters and basic MFA are no longer sufficient barriers. In parallel, attackers are shifting from hacking infrastructure to hijacking identity and trust systems—installing legitimate remote-access tools via phishing, exploiting API authentication flaws like BOLA, and harvesting credentials through malicious AI browser extensions that spy on users in real time. This identity-focused shift compounds with the persistent exploitation of older vulnerabilities; groups like SHADOW-EARTH-053 still use years-old ProxyLogon flaws on unpatched Exchange servers, while CISA confirms CVE-2026-32202 (Microsoft Windows) and CVE-2026-41940 (cPanel) are already being exploited in the wild. Because AI models like Claude Mythos can now autonomously chain these vulnerabilities into working exploits at machine speed, defenders cannot rely on manual patching cadences to stay safe. These trends together suggest that the real perimeter is no longer the firewall but the identity layer, and defending it requires phishing-resistant authentication, automated response, and rigorous vetting of developer pipelines and third-party trust. Watch for AI-accelerated exploitation of unpatched systems and invest in identity-centric, machine-speed defenses before the next wave of automated attacks outpaces your team's response.
