Why East-West Visibility Matters for Grid Security
The convergence of IT and OT in electric grid infrastructure has increased the risk of lateral movement by adversaries. To protect critical operations and comply with regulations like NERC-CIP-15, organizations must implement deep east-west network visibility capable of understanding specialized industrial protocols.
Authors: Vitaliy Shtym
Key Takeaways
- The convergence of IT and OT environments in electric grids introduces significant lateral movement risks.
- East-west traffic visibility inside the Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP) is critical to detecting threats before they disrupt operations.
- Regulatory standards like NERC-CIP-15 increasingly emphasize the need for internal network monitoring in Bulk Electric Systems (BES).
- Traditional IT security tools often lack the context to interpret specialized industrial protocols like DNP3, IEC 61850, OPC, and Modbus.
Affected Systems
- Bulk Electric System (BES)
- Operational Technology (OT)
- Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
- SCADA systems
Attack Chain
Attackers breach the initial perimeter, often through interconnected IT environments or supply chain vulnerabilities. Once inside, they use east-west traffic to move laterally across the network. They methodically map the environment, escalate privileges, and identify high-value operational assets like SCADA systems or controllers before executing disruptive objectives.
Detection Availability
- YARA Rules: No
- Sigma Rules: No
- Snort/Suricata Rules: No
- KQL Queries: No
- Splunk SPL Queries: No
- EQL Queries: No
- Other Detection Logic: No
No specific detection rules or queries are provided in the article.
Detection Engineering Assessment
EDR Visibility: Medium — EDR can monitor IT endpoints, but traditional EDR often lacks visibility into legacy OT devices and specialized industrial controllers. Network Visibility: High — The article heavily emphasizes network monitoring for east-west traffic and industrial protocols (DNP3, Modbus, etc.) as the primary detection mechanism. Detection Difficulty: Moderate — Detecting lateral movement in OT requires specialized tools that understand industrial protocols and can baseline normal east-west traffic to spot anomalies.
Required Log Sources
- Network Flow Logs
- PCAP
- OT/ICS Protocol Logs
Hunting Hypotheses
| Hypothesis | Telemetry | ATT&CK Stage | FP Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adversaries are moving laterally from IT to OT networks using standard administrative protocols or compromised credentials. | Network flow logs crossing the IT/OT boundary (Electronic Security Perimeter). | Lateral Movement | Medium |
| Unauthorized devices or vendor systems are communicating directly with critical SCADA controllers using industrial protocols like Modbus or DNP3. | OT network protocol logs and asset inventory data. | Discovery | Low |
Control Gaps
- Lack of east-west traffic visibility
- Inability to parse industrial protocols (DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850)
- Unmanaged vendor/contractor devices
Key Behavioral Indicators
- Anomalous east-west communication patterns
- Unexpected use of industrial protocols from non-engineering workstations
False Positive Assessment
- Low
Recommendations
Immediate Mitigation
- Identify and inventory all devices connected to the OT network, including unmanaged vendor systems.
Infrastructure Hardening
- Implement network segmentation to strictly control traffic between IT and OT environments.
- Deploy OT-aware network monitoring to inspect east-west traffic inside the Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP).
User Protection
- Enforce strict access controls and privilege management for users accessing operational systems.
Security Awareness
- Train security personnel on industrial protocols and the specific operational context of the grid environment.
- Ensure compliance with NERC-CIP-15 monitoring requirements.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1021 - Remote Services
- T1046 - Network Service Discovery
- T0884 - Connection Proxy
- T0885 - Commonly Used Port
