Weaponizing Trust Signals: Claude Code Lures and GitHub Release Payloads

Key Takeaways

• Anthropic accidentally leaked internal Claude Code source via an npm package misconfiguration, exposing 512,000 lines of code.
• Threat actors weaponized the leak within 24 hours, distributing Vidar stealer and GhostSocks proxy via fake GitHub repositories.
• The campaign uses a Rust-compiled dropper (TradeAI.exe) with extensive anti-analysis, VM detection, and sandbox evasion techniques.
• An embedded PowerShell payload systematically disables Windows Defender features and modifies firewall rules to allow C2 communication.
• The leaked source code itself poses long-term risks, including vulnerability discovery and prompt injection blueprinting.

Affected Systems

• Windows
• Developer Environments
• Gaming PCs

Attack Chain

Victims are lured to fake GitHub repositories promising leaked Claude Code or other popular software. They download a trojanized 7z archive containing a Rust-compiled dropper (e.g., TradeAI.exe). Upon execution, the dropper performs extensive anti-analysis checks, decrypts an embedded PowerShell payload to disable Windows Defender and modify firewall rules, and establishes C2 communication. Finally, it deploys Vidar stealer to exfiltrate credentials and GhostSocks to establish a proxy on the infected host.

Detection Availability

• YARA Rules: No
• Sigma Rules: No
• Snort/Suricata Rules: No
• KQL Queries: No
• Splunk SPL Queries: No
• EQL Queries: No
• Other Detection Logic: Yes
• Platforms: TrendAI Vision One

TrendAI Vision One provides specific hunting queries to detect Vidar and GhostSocks malware events, as well as network connections to known C&C servers like rti.cargomanbd.com.

Detection Engineering Assessment

EDR Visibility: High — The malware relies heavily on PowerShell to modify Defender settings and firewall rules, which are highly visible in EDR telemetry (AMSI, process creation, registry modifications). Network Visibility: Medium — C2 communication uses standard HTTP/HTTPS to Pastebin and snippet.host, which may blend with legitimate traffic, but the specific URLs and fallback mechanisms can be monitored. Detection Difficulty: Moderate — The Rust dropper's anti-analysis and XOR encryption make static analysis difficult, but the noisy PowerShell execution to disable Defender provides strong behavioral detection opportunities.

Required Log Sources

• Process Creation (Event ID 4688)
• PowerShell Operational (Event ID 4104)
• Windows Defender Operational
• Windows Firewall Operational

Hunting Hypotheses

Control Gaps

• Lack of strict application control allowing execution of unsigned binaries from user directories
• Permissive outbound network access to paste sites

Key Behavioral Indicators

• PowerShell disabling Defender features (-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen, -MAPSReporting 0)
• Environment variable 'cryptify_keyd3d' usage
• Process tree: svchost.exe -> ClaudeCode_x64.exe -> powershell.exe

False Positive Assessment

• Low

Recommendations

Immediate Mitigation

• Block access to the identified C2 URLs and domains.
• Search endpoints for files named ClaudeCode_x64.exe, TradeAI.exe, or related 7z archives.
• Isolate hosts showing signs of Vidar or GhostSocks infection.

Infrastructure Hardening

• Restrict execution of unsigned binaries from user profile directories.
• Implement strict outbound firewall rules to block unnecessary access to paste sites and untrusted domains.
• Ensure Windows Defender Tamper Protection is enabled to prevent malicious PowerShell scripts from disabling security features.

User Protection

• Deploy EDR solutions with behavioral monitoring to catch anti-analysis and Defender tampering activities.
• Enforce policies requiring developers to install tools only from official, verified sources.

Security Awareness

• Train developers and users on the risks of downloading software from unverified GitHub repositories or third-party links.
• Highlight the specific tactic of threat actors using trending topics (like leaked source code) as lures.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1608.001 - Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware
• T1585.003 - Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts
• T1566.002 - Phishing: Spearphishing Link
• T1204.002 - User Execution: Malicious File
• T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information
• T1497.001 - Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
• T1555 - Credentials from Password Stores
• T1005 - Data from Local System
• T1102.001 - Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
• T1090.003 - Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy
• T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
• T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
• T1059.001 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Additional IOCs

• Domains:
  • rti[.]cargomanbd[.]com - Vidar C&C server
• Urls:
  • github[.]com/Kawaii-GPT-ai/KawaiiGPT/releases/ - KawaiiGPT lure repository
  • github[.]com/ai-wormGPT/wormGPT/releases/ - WormGPT lure repository
  • github[.]com/claude-ai-opus-4-6/claude-opus-4.6/releases/ - Claude Opus 4.6 lure repository
  • github[.]com/realtime-voice-changer-app/realtime-voice-changer/releases/ - Voicemod lure repository
  • github[.]com/LTX-desktop/LTX-2.3/releases/ - LTX video editor lure repository
  • github[.]com/nvidia-nemoclaw/NemoClaw/releases/ - NVIDIA NemoClaw lure repository
• Registry Keys:
  • HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 - Queried by malware to collect CPU information
  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run - Targeted for persistence (observed in execution profile)
• File Paths:
  • C:\Users - Added to Windows Defender exclusion paths
  • $env:TEMP - Added to Windows Defender exclusion paths
  • C:\ProgramData - Added to Windows Defender exclusion paths
  • C:\OneDriveTemp - Added to Windows Defender exclusion paths
  • C:\Users\Public - Added to Windows Defender exclusion paths
  • C:\Windows - Added to Windows Defender exclusion paths
• Command Lines:
  • Purpose: Disable Windows Defender MAPS Reporting | Tools: PowerShell, Add-MpPreference | Stage: Defense Evasion | -MAPSReporting 0
  • Purpose: Disable Windows Defender Block at First Seen | Tools: PowerShell | Stage: Defense Evasion | -DisableBlockAtFirstSeen $true
  • Purpose: Disable Windows Defender Sample Submission | Tools: PowerShell | Stage: Defense Evasion | -SubmitSamplesConsent NeverSend
  • Purpose: Disable Windows Defender Cloud Block Level | Tools: PowerShell | Stage: Defense Evasion | -CloudBlockLevel 0
  • Purpose: Disable Windows Defender PUA Protection | Tools: PowerShell | Stage: Defense Evasion | -PUAProtection disable
  • Purpose: Disable Windows Defender IOAV Protection | Tools: PowerShell | Stage: Defense Evasion | -DisableIOAVProtection $true
  • Purpose: Disable Windows Defender Behavior Monitoring | Tools: PowerShell | Stage: Defense Evasion | -DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true
  • Purpose: Add Windows Defender path exclusions | Tools: PowerShell, Add-MpPreference | Stage: Defense Evasion | Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath
  • Purpose: Add Windows Defender process exclusions for PowerShell | Tools: PowerShell, Add-MpPreference | Stage: Defense Evasion | Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'powershell.exe'
  • Purpose: Create inbound firewall rules for C2 communication | Tools: PowerShell, New-NetFirewallRule | Stage: Defense Evasion
  • Purpose: Execute decoded PowerShell payload | Tools: PowerShell | Stage: Execution | powershell.exe" -NoProfile -No...
• Other:
  • idbzoomh - Threat actor GitHub account
  • idbzoomh1 - Threat actor GitHub account
  • my3jie - Threat actor GitHub account
  • cryptify_keyd3d - Environment variable checked for XOR decryption key
  • xnasff3wcedj - Hardcoded default XOR decryption key