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The SOC Files 5: Ghost in the pipeline, or a fileless SharePoint breach by Storm-2603

Storm-2603 exploits SharePoint ToolShell CVEs to deploy a fileless in-memory webshell in w3wp.exe, escalating to SYSTEM via EfsPotato and deploying Warlock ransomware. Storm-2603 exploits CVE-2025-53770/53771 in on-premises SharePoint to inject a fileless C# webshell into w3wp.exe via ASP.NET VirtualPathProvider registration. The implant uses a custom XOR-obfuscated binary protocol triggered by a specific User-Agent, enabling TCP tunneling with suo5. Post-exploitation includes EfsPotato privilege escalation, SAM RPC account creation, Velociraptor deployment, and Warlock ransomware with EDR-killing via vulnerable driver sideloading.

Sens:■ ImmediateConf:highAnalyzed:2026-11-06DeepSeek

Authors: Alexander Rodchenko, Rodrigo Wanderson

ActorsStorm-2603WarlockLockBit

Source:Kaspersky

Indicators of Compromise23
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Detection / HunterDeepSeek

Immediate Actions

  • Patch on-premises SharePoint for CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771 immediately
  • Isolate compromised SharePoint hosts and rotate SharePoint MachineKey
  • Block C2 IPs: 45[.]91[.]94[.]204, 91[.]224[.]92[.]121, 204[.]76[.]203[.]219, 49[.]51[.]132[.]100
  • Hunt for w3wp.exe spawning msiexec.exe or establishing outbound TCP connections

Key Takeaways

  • CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771 are ToolShell deserialization RCE flaws in on-premises SharePoint, both in CISA KEV
  • Webshell uses VirtualPathProvider registration to serve virtual pages without disk artifacts, evading file-based detection
  • Privilege escalation via EfsPotato EFSRPC named pipe impersonation abuses SeImpersonatePrivilege in w3wp.exe
  • Velociraptor 0[.]73[.]4[.]0 (CVE-2025-6264) abused for post-exploitation alongside Zoho Assist, VS Code, and Cloudflare tunnels
  • Warlock ransomware AV killer uses rsndispot.sys driver sideloading to terminate EDR solutions

Attack Chain

  1. Initial Access: ONYPHE probes SharePoint ToolPane endpoint for CVE-2025-53770 vulnerability fingerprinting
  2. Exploitation: Crafted HTTP request triggers deserialization RCE in w3wp.exe via CVE-2025-53770
  3. Persistence: In-memory webshell registered as VirtualPathProvider in ASP.NET runtime, no disk artifacts
  4. Privilege Escalation: EfsPotato EFSRPC coercion impersonates LSASS SYSTEM token via named pipe
  5. Lateral Movement: Velociraptor, Zoho Assist, VS Code, and Cloudflare tunnels deployed for persistent access
  6. Impact: Warlock ransomware and EDR killer deployed; ransomware blocked by Kaspersky

Affected Systems

  • On-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server
  • Windows IIS running w3wp.exe
  • Velociraptor 0.73.4.0

Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

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CVEProductSeverityDescription
CVE-2025-53770Microsoft SharePoint Server (ToolShell)CriticalDeserialization RCE via crafted HTTP requests to ToolPane endpoint
CVE-2025-53771Microsoft SharePoint Server (ToolShell)CriticalToolShell vulnerability enabling remote code execution in SharePoint
CVE-2025-6264Velociraptor 0.73.4.0Vulnerability in Velociraptor DFIR tool enabling attacker command execution

Detection Availability

  • Published: YARA
  • Platforms: CLRDeserializationExploitFinder, VirtualPathProvider Lab, external article (Russian) with YARA examples

YARA rules for deserialization gadget detection and ETW-based VPP webshell detection referenced; CLRDeserializationExploitFinder tool available

Detection Engineering Assessment

Hunting Hypotheses

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HypothesisTelemetryStageFP Risk
w3wp.exe loading Microsoft.GeneratedCode and App_Web_toolpane.aspx assemblies within same execution window indicates deserialization exploitation (T1190).NET assembly load eventsInitial AccessLow — assemblies only co-load during ToolPane deserialization
w3wp.exe establishing outbound TCP connections to internal hosts indicates proxy tunneling via suo5 (T1572)EDR network telemetryLateral MovementMedium — SharePoint may legitimately connect to internal services
IIS ETW events 25 and 47 mapping virtual paths without corresponding FileChangeNotification events 17-19 indicate VPP webshell (T1505.003)ETW Microsoft-Windows-IIS-ConfigurationPersistenceLow — legitimate VPPs can be allowlisted
w3wp.exe spawning msiexec.exe to install remote MSI packages indicates post-exploitation tool deployment (T1218.007)Sysmon Event ID 1ExecutionLow — SharePoint does not normally spawn msiexec

Required Log Sources

  • IIS logs
  • ETW Microsoft-Windows-IIS-Configuration
  • Sysmon Event ID 1
  • Sysmon Event ID 3
  • Sysmon Event ID 7
  • .NET CLR assembly load events

Control Gaps

  • Fileless webshell in w3wp.exe bypasses file-based webshell detection
  • Custom XOR-obfuscated binary protocol over HTTP blends with normal traffic
  • SPN exit nodes bypass standard Tor blocklists
  • Legitimate tools abused for persistence evade application-specific monitoring

Recommendations

Infrastructure Hardening

  • Restrict outbound connections from SharePoint/IIS servers to known endpoints
  • Monitor IIS ETW events 25/47 without corresponding file change events 17-19
  • Block SPN exit node traffic at network perimeter
  • Deploy ETW-based monitoring for VirtualPathProvider registrations

User Protection

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for token impersonation and named pipe coercion
  • Alert on vulnerable driver rsndispot.sys loading from C:\ProgramData
  • Monitor for Velociraptor, Zoho Assist, VS Code tunnels on SharePoint hosts
  • Enable ransomware behavior blocking equivalent to Kaspersky Proactive Defense Module

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

IOCs · 23
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