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Swallowtail: Russian Espionage Group Targets Defense Firms in Two NATO Countries

Russian GRU-linked APT28 deployed Hookedge backdoor and ld.exe reflective loader against NATO defense firms, stealing credentials via SSH reverse tunneling and NTLM capture during a multi-month espionage intrusion. Hookedge communicates via webhook.site using a hidden 1-pixel Edge browser instance for C2 tasking. After initial foothold, attackers escalated to dedicated IP 185.82.218.119, established a persistent SSH reverse tunnel, and deployed ld.exe, an undocumented reflective loader decrypting in-memory payloads.

Sens:▲ 24hConf:highAnalyzed:2026-11-05Z.ai

Authors: Symantec Threat Hunter Team

ActorsAPT28HookedgeBlueDelta

Source:Symantec

Indicators of Compromise31
21sha2565url3file path2ip
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Detection / HunterZ.ai

Immediate Actions

  • Block IP 185[.]82[.]218[.]119 on all perimeter firewalls and proxy gateways
  • Hunt for msedge.exe with 1-pixel window flags across endpoint telemetry
  • Search for id_rsa files in C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ on all endpoints
  • Isolate any hosts with confirmed Hookedge hashes present

Key Takeaways

  • Intrusion at naval shipbuilder lasted from July 24 through late September 2026
  • Hookedge backdoor first documented by Recorded Future Insikt Group in August 2026
  • ld.exe payload marker starts with ADSA (0x41534441); decrypted payload not recovered
  • C2 shifted from webhook.site to dedicated IP 185[.]82[.]218[.]119 after initial access
  • Macro split VBA source into fragments joined at runtime to evade static AV scanning

Attack Chain

  1. Initial Access: Phishing email delivers macro-enabled Word document to naval shipbuilder
  2. Execution: VBA macro drops VBScript, HTML pair, and batch script to user profile
  3. C2 Communication: Hidden 1-pixel Edge browser fetches tasks from webhook.site endpoint
  4. Discovery: Reconnaissance batch probes outbound connectivity and enumerates host configuration
  5. Credential Access: SSH key pushed for reverse tunnel; NTLM hash captured via loopback listener
  6. Persistence: Reflective loader ld.exe decrypts Events.dat payload in memory with runtime key

Affected Systems

  • Microsoft Windows endpoints (naval shipbuilder network)
  • Microsoft Outlook (email delivery vector)
  • Microsoft Word (macro-enabled document dropper)
  • Microsoft Edge browser (hidden C2 relay)
  • OpenSSH client (reverse tunnel establishment)

Detection Engineering Assessment

Hunting Hypotheses

copy:
HypothesisTelemetryStageFP Risk
Edge browser launched with 1x1 pixel window size and off-screen position by batch script (T1218)Process creation with command-line argumentsExecutionLow — normal Edge usage never uses 1x1 pixel windows
SSH client with -R reverse tunnel flag executed from C:\ProgramData (T1021.004)Process creation with command-line argumentsCommand and ControlLow — SSH from ProgramData with reverse tunnel is abnormal
PowerShell HttpListener on loopback with net use in background job (T1003)PowerShell script block logs and process creationCredential AccessMedium — legitimate admin tools may use HttpListener
curl downloading from raw IP addresses with UUID paths over HTTPS (T1105)Network connection and process creation logsCommand and ControlMedium — curl is common but UUID paths on raw IPs unusual

Required Log Sources

  • Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation)
  • Sysmon Event ID 11 (file creation)
  • PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104)
  • DNS query logs
  • SSH connection logs
  • Network connection logs

Control Gaps

  • Static AV scanning defeated by fragmented VBA macro obfuscation
  • webhook.site C2 traffic appears as legitimate web service
  • Edge browser as HTTP downloader evades network-based download detection
  • Credential theft via self-capture bypasses network credential monitoring

Recommendations

Infrastructure Hardening

  • Block webhook.site domain on egress proxy for non-essential systems
  • Restrict outbound SSH connections from workstation subnets
  • Disable macro execution for documents from external email sources
  • Monitor for curl connections to raw IP addresses over HTTPS

User Protection

  • Warn defense sector employees about targeted phishing with Word attachments
  • Quarantine email attachments with macros from external senders
  • Block Office documents with macros at email gateway where possible

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

IOCs · 31
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