6 minhigh
Swallowtail: Russian Espionage Group Targets Defense Firms in Two NATO Countries
Russian GRU-linked APT28 deployed Hookedge backdoor and ld.exe reflective loader against NATO defense firms, stealing credentials via SSH reverse tunneling and NTLM capture during a multi-month espionage intrusion. Hookedge communicates via webhook.site using a hidden 1-pixel Edge browser instance for C2 tasking. After initial foothold, attackers escalated to dedicated IP 185.82.218.119, established a persistent SSH reverse tunnel, and deployed ld.exe, an undocumented reflective loader decrypting in-memory payloads.
Sens:▲ 24hConf:highAnalyzed:2026-11-05Z.ai
Authors: Symantec Threat Hunter Team
ActorsAPT28HookedgeBlueDelta
Source:Symantec
Detection / HunterZ.ai
Immediate Actions
- Block IP 185[.]82[.]218[.]119 on all perimeter firewalls and proxy gateways
- Hunt for msedge.exe with 1-pixel window flags across endpoint telemetry
- Search for id_rsa files in C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ on all endpoints
- Isolate any hosts with confirmed Hookedge hashes present
Key Takeaways
- Intrusion at naval shipbuilder lasted from July 24 through late September 2026
- Hookedge backdoor first documented by Recorded Future Insikt Group in August 2026
- ld.exe payload marker starts with ADSA (0x41534441); decrypted payload not recovered
- C2 shifted from webhook.site to dedicated IP 185[.]82[.]218[.]119 after initial access
- Macro split VBA source into fragments joined at runtime to evade static AV scanning
Attack Chain
- Initial Access: Phishing email delivers macro-enabled Word document to naval shipbuilder
- Execution: VBA macro drops VBScript, HTML pair, and batch script to user profile
- C2 Communication: Hidden 1-pixel Edge browser fetches tasks from webhook.site endpoint
- Discovery: Reconnaissance batch probes outbound connectivity and enumerates host configuration
- Credential Access: SSH key pushed for reverse tunnel; NTLM hash captured via loopback listener
- Persistence: Reflective loader ld.exe decrypts Events.dat payload in memory with runtime key
Affected Systems
- Microsoft Windows endpoints (naval shipbuilder network)
- Microsoft Outlook (email delivery vector)
- Microsoft Word (macro-enabled document dropper)
- Microsoft Edge browser (hidden C2 relay)
- OpenSSH client (reverse tunnel establishment)
Detection Engineering Assessment
Hunting Hypotheses
| Hypothesis | Telemetry | Stage | FP Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Edge browser launched with 1x1 pixel window size and off-screen position by batch script (T1218) | Process creation with command-line arguments | Execution | Low — normal Edge usage never uses 1x1 pixel windows |
| SSH client with -R reverse tunnel flag executed from C:\ProgramData (T1021.004) | Process creation with command-line arguments | Command and Control | Low — SSH from ProgramData with reverse tunnel is abnormal |
| PowerShell HttpListener on loopback with net use in background job (T1003) | PowerShell script block logs and process creation | Credential Access | Medium — legitimate admin tools may use HttpListener |
| curl downloading from raw IP addresses with UUID paths over HTTPS (T1105) | Network connection and process creation logs | Command and Control | Medium — curl is common but UUID paths on raw IPs unusual |
Required Log Sources
- Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation)
- Sysmon Event ID 11 (file creation)
- PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104)
- DNS query logs
- SSH connection logs
- Network connection logs
Control Gaps
- Static AV scanning defeated by fragmented VBA macro obfuscation
- webhook.site C2 traffic appears as legitimate web service
- Edge browser as HTTP downloader evades network-based download detection
- Credential theft via self-capture bypasses network credential monitoring
Recommendations
Infrastructure Hardening
- Block webhook.site domain on egress proxy for non-essential systems
- Restrict outbound SSH connections from workstation subnets
- Disable macro execution for documents from external email sources
- Monitor for curl connections to raw IP addresses over HTTPS
User Protection
- Warn defense sector employees about targeted phishing with Word attachments
- Quarantine email attachments with macros from external senders
- Block Office documents with macros at email gateway where possible
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping18 techniques
Tactic
Initial Access
Tactic
Execution
Tactic
Credential Access
Tactic
Discovery
Tactic
Lateral Movement
Tactic
Command and Control
Showing defanged values
- file_pathC:\ProgramData\Adobe\id_rsaSSH private key pushed by attacker for tunnel
- file_pathC:\ProgramData\Events.datEncrypted payload file for ld.exe
- file_pathC:\ProgramData\ld.exeReflective loader dropped by attacker
- ip185[.]82[.]218[.]119Dedicated C2 server for tasking and exfiltration after initial webhook.site stage
- ip23[.]220[.]75[.]245Hard-coded IP probed during reconnaissance for outbound connectivity check
- sha256063930af6a4aad06d8f8aab43226bf6dcddd2c79aa505894ee95876cf9254543Hookedge VBS launcher
- sha2561bb1b27e1695c726c7c1d3d4935f9318afc6f5fd9015d7cf3890f0eb7bf8d47eHookedge dropper
- sha2561bff55104206d3f55cd72ca58ffecd2fa620a428c5a3c6987d3c4cc68285d335Hookedge dropper
- sha2562fceca3460a35eea2b21c47d73c27c27edae95d2ae29ffb4ec2222d1a223b4bdHookedge dropper
- sha25639d21c1b8ab2f08c75a1cb7d18433a8b207c71ec1d266bb049b54b7eaf01d67bHookedge dropper
- sha25649e276498fc4e7d65ebf9fa2acf64ec2a0c25e75ac621cd6a203d64fb75aa495Hookedge dropper
- sha2564a43aacffc2d8d76f7abac729238779b6c99b10ee09f54c2cea1654a91561303Hookedge dropper
- sha2565709e5e1496410d4b9ac5a3bd8be3ec4595f881b4865ebf6e490784b56105645Hookedge dropper
- sha25660ef547ebd2f4252e286db762980481b0da23dcd2c84465509735544c0a9c2b3Hookedge dropper
- sha2566678049918dda2d5859de0a95e0573fec9496c62bbe72967ae0d3deeb5bda68fHookedge dropper
- sha25668613e232d0893e61ad29906daee2312bd4c4e940f4d0c9e702e7c35a256d0f7Hookedge dropper
- sha256a3b44405112e6364447e5d96630edfabcf81e5ad37d690c3ebc73770d62aeabdHookedge dropper
- sha256a92413d4951a28822ec85e5c0d1948d4160b91388c5f3d86504611fc286a4d13Hookedge dropper
- sha256aafbc096e20f259df9166f837d0baf7333f177e6f383ca7cb9215936ecbe7f5eHookedge VBS launcher
- sha256c2c9187033d22d7944ea9298461a0ac693ef2774b4ce08b0955d2aba3646fb44Hookedge dropper
- sha256d74c65e6d35d3b2a80686f059590f919316ecaf4ed539192e904d675ba5c7a40Hookedge VBS launcher
- sha256e068794cf43e381b26c82d746cca107b9f84327a2a8308d5b87ea5529963c4c8Hookedge dropper
- sha256e8be50171436550e1edd8b4946d2adc0870e97465f67526ea252bff0815abcbeHookedge dropper
- sha256e94402a9886d4433ccad0ced0cd4f22d055d1f0f7e4155dbec992433eb94e00cHookedge dropper
- sha256ea525336b787c2fd3dbc4b3e9a3a78f71004e1bd43e2e1ed953edad51118cb72Hookedge dropper
- sha256f1cc91e7427a22027f65d31bbee19c54b602d08d7d93e4745b9cea59fa8132ffld.exe reflective loader decrypting in-memory payload with ADSA marker
- urlhxxps://webhook[.]site/53379b62-8020-41cf-af57-effa6e1e8506Second-stage Hookedge tasking webhook used after initial access
- urlhxxps://webhook[.]site/5b73dc69-d765-4440-a4d2-e9eb33283eb9C2 session webhook for individual task fetch and result upload
- urlhxxps://webhook[.]site/890efd8d-6e9e-428a-bcf9-987745d71000Initial Hookedge C2 webhook for task delivery and result reporting
- urlhxxps://webhook[.]site/ca3c058e-3c88-449b-8299-822cd5d5e17cAdditional Hookedge C2 webhook endpoint
- urlhxxps://webhook[.]site/d828b9fc-5435-4b1c-881f-d6350c11d0b6Additional Hookedge C2 webhook endpoint