StealC Is Back, and This Time It's a RAT
StealC's seller resurfaced as Stadia, a full RAT adding HVNC, remote shell, and in-memory loading to StealC 3.5, targeting Windows hosts via three bare-IP C2 servers. Stadia is a 32-bit MSVC Windows RAT that embeds StealC 3.5's stealer as one of six modules. It persists via hidden scheduled tasks under C:\ProgramData\, injects into suspended browser processes to steal credentials, and beacons over HTTP to three hard-coded bare IPs using RC4-encrypted, Base64-encoded JSON bodies. The builder panel at stadiawatch.cc compiles per-customer builds with rotating keys and tokens.
Detection / HunterZ.ai
Immediate Actions
- Block C2 IPs 93[.]152[.]213[.]215, 91[.]92[.]43[.]45, 193[.]148[.]56[.]97 at perimeter
- Add SHA-256 ea928494... to endpoint blocklist and EDR signatures
- Hunt for hidden scheduled tasks with PT15M and P3650D attributes
- Search for Defender exclusions under C:\ProgramData\ via PowerShell
Key Takeaways
- Panel and agent version 1.1.2; first beta 10 Sep 2026; Stealer updated to stealc 3.5.0 on 29 Sep 2026.
- Stealer collects from 50+ browsers, 120+ crypto plugins, 50+ desktop wallets, messengers, gaming platforms, and VPN clients.
- Locale gate exits on Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Kazakh, or Uzbek system languages.
- 26,112-byte Chromium App-Bound Encryption helper blob shared byte-for-byte with StealC v3.5 x86 and x64 builds.
- Pricing: Basic $300, Team $550, Pro $900 per month; former StealC customers get free Pro month.
Attack Chain
- Initial Access: Compiled .exe delivered from builder panel to victim host
- Execution: Agent installs under C:\ProgramData\ with impersonated updater filename
- Persistence: Hidden scheduled task at logon and every 15 minutes for 3,650 days
- C2: HTTP POST to bare IP with RC4-encrypted Base64-encoded JSON body
- Collection: Stealer harvests browser credentials, crypto wallets, and session tokens
- Exfiltration: Data sent via C2 in StealC log archive format
Affected Systems
- Windows 11
- Windows Server 2022
Detection Availability
- Published: Sigma
- Platforms: Varonis Threat Labs
Sigma rule for hidden 15-minute scheduled task from ProgramData; Python RC4 string decryption script provided.
Detection Engineering Assessment
Hunting Hypotheses
| Hypothesis | Telemetry | Stage | FP Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unsigned process from C:\ProgramData\ creates suspended Chrome, Edge, or Brave process and writes code into it (T1055.001) | Sysmon Event ID 8 and Event ID 1 | Execution | Low — suspended browser with remote write is rare |
| Hidden scheduled task with PT15M interval and P3650D duration created via COM API from C:\ProgramData\ (T1053.005) | Windows Security Event 4698/4702 with TaskContent XML | Persistence | Low — specific interval and duration combination is unusual |
| PowerShell Add-MpPreference adds Defender exclusion path under C:\ProgramData\ (T1562.001) | PowerShell ScriptBlock Event 4104 | Defense Evasion | Medium — admin scripts may add exclusions |
| HTTP POST to bare IP address with Content-Type application/json but non-JSON Base64 body (T1071.001) | Network proxy or firewall HTTP logs | Command and Control | Low — bare IP with JSON mismatch is uncommon |
Required Log Sources
- Windows Security Event 4698
- Windows Security Event 4702
- Sysmon Event ID 1
- Sysmon Event ID 8
- Sysmon Event ID 11
- PowerShell ScriptBlock Event 4104
Control Gaps
- Signature-based AV may miss due to no packer and thin imports
- schtasks.exe-scoped rules miss COM-registered tasks
- Network inspection limited by encrypted body despite HTTP
- Per-build C2 rotation defeats static IP blocklists
Recommendations
Infrastructure Hardening
- Block HTTP egress to bare IP addresses on port 80
- Alert on Content-Type application/json with non-JSON body
- Restrict PowerShell Add-MpPreference to domain administrators only
- Monitor COM-based scheduled task creation, not just schtasks.exe
User Protection
- Enable Chrome App-Bound Encryption where available
- Monitor Chrome, Edge, Brave for suspended process injection
- Restrict write permissions to C:\ProgramData\ subdirectories
- Enable Windows Defender tamper protection
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- domainstadiawatch[.]ccOperator panel domain for Stadia RAT
- file_pathC:\ProgramData\wzoHcrvZt9RX\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exeTest install path observed in lab environment
- ip193[.]148[.]56[.]97Tertiary C2 server, failover order
- ip91[.]92[.]43[.]45Secondary C2 server, failover order
- ip93[.]152[.]213[.]215Primary C2 server, HTTP POST on port 80
- md5028afae8b5e9953e1cd84a003c42fd85Imphash of outer PE, only KERNEL32.dll imported
- md57739a8d0d101ca82b93bbd0acdb6d9afSame stadia_x32.exe sample
- sha11ba76d2029744cc6e2f7209c96a696b32962b1f1Same stadia_x32.exe sample
- sha2560e5337a4cc8ebc772bc50f6e79befd1e8efad3410022e050d08d5269733c4ea4Shared App-Bound helper blob linking Stadia to StealC 3.5
- sha256ea928494fd30d88b98141d39a502a4324889fb732e74b44bfee12c72137dd73eStadia agent sample stadia_x32.exe, agent version 1.1.2
- urlhxxp://193[.]148[.]56[.]97/Tertiary C2, HTTP POST to root path
- urlhxxp://91[.]92[.]43[.]45/Secondary C2, HTTP POST to root path
- urlhxxp://93[.]152[.]213[.]215/Primary C2, HTTP POST to root path