6 minhigh
New Lindnor Backdoor and Glut of Security Killers Used in Ransomware Attack on U.S. Org
Anubis ransomware affiliates deployed a new custom backdoor called Lindnor and 13 security-killing tools via BYOVD against a U.S. organization, but encryption was blocked before execution. Attackers used Backdoor.Lindnor masquerading as Chrome and VMware components on two SQL Servers, communicating over port 443 to C2 domains. Within an hour they dropped 13 executables and 5 vulnerable drivers to disable security software, configured AnyDesk for Safe Mode persistence, and attempted to run the Anubis payload iservice.exe.
Sens:▲ 24hConf:highAnalyzed:2026-11-06DeepSeek
ActorsHawkmothAnubisBackdoor.Lindnor
Source:Symantec
Detection / HunterDeepSeek
Immediate Actions
- Block C2 domains msrcontrib[.]com and cfgsync-relay[.]eastus[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]com at network controls
- Quarantine machines with healthcontroller64.exe or svchelper.exe present
- Block all 24 file hashes on endpoints and network perimeter
- Hunt for SafeBoot\Network registry additions across the estate
Key Takeaways
- Backdoor.Lindnor is a previously undocumented custom backdoor found on two Microsoft SQL Server machines.
- 13 security-disabling executables and 5 vulnerable signed drivers were dropped within roughly one hour.
- AnyDesk was configured to run in Safe Mode with Networking via a registry modification.
- Anubis ransomware is operated by Hawkmoth, a rebrand of Sphinx RaaS from December 2024.
- Anubis has claimed approximately 96 victims in 12 months, 52% in the U.S.
Attack Chain
- Initial Access: Unknown; first indicator was Backdoor.Lindnor on two Microsoft SQL Servers
- Persistence: Backdoor installed as service; AnyDesk configured for Safe Mode; new local user created
- Defense Evasion: 13 executables and 5 vulnerable signed drivers dropped within one hour to kill security software via BYOVD
- Command and Control: Lindnor backdoor sends system info to C2 servers over port 443 with primary and fallback domains
- Impact: Anubis ransomware payload iservice.exe blocked before encryption phase could execute
Affected Systems
- Microsoft SQL Server machines
- Windows endpoints in U.S. organizations
- Systems with AnyDesk remote access tool
Detection Engineering Assessment
Hunting Hypotheses
| Hypothesis | Telemetry | Stage | FP Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Processes named healthcontroller64.exe or svchelper.exe running as services from Chrome or VMware directories (T1036.005) | Sysmon Event ID 1 | Persistence | Low — non-standard paths for these names |
| Registry modifications under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network adding services (T1562.009) | Sysmon Event ID 13 | Defense Evasion | Low — rare administrative action |
| Multiple executables with -d switch loaded in rapid succession to remove kernel callbacks via vulnerable drivers (T1562.001) | EDR process telemetry | Defense Evasion | Medium — admin tools may use similar switches |
| Five vulnerable driver files (havoc.sys, monprocessex.sys, xhunter1.sys, bdapiutil64.sys, fly.sys) loaded within one hour (T1068) | Sysmon Event ID 6 | Privilege Escalation | Low — known malicious driver names |
Required Log Sources
- Sysmon Event ID 1 process creation
- Sysmon Event ID 12/13 registry changes
- Sysmon Event ID 6 driver loaded
- Windows Security Event ID 4720 account created
- DNS resolution logs
- Web proxy logs
Control Gaps
- Safe Mode operation bypasses full security software coverage
- Signed vulnerable drivers evade driver signature enforcement
- BYOVD tools masquerading as Symantec software may bypass allowlisting
- Two executables (huntreagent.exe, s1.exe) were not blocked by endpoint protection
Recommendations
Infrastructure Hardening
- Enable Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist on all Windows hosts
- Deploy driver block rules for havoc.sys, monprocessex.sys, xhunter1.sys, bdapiutil64.sys, fly.sys
- Restrict AnyDesk installation and execution on server infrastructure
- Monitor SafeBoot registry keys for unauthorized service registrations
User Protection
- Deploy updated endpoint signatures for Backdoor.Lindnor variants
- Enable EDR tamper protection and kernel callback protection features
- Alert on new local user account creation on SQL Servers
- Block iservice.exe and associated Anubis ransomware indicators
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping12 techniques
Tactic
Privilege Escalation
Tactic
Stealth
Tactic
Discovery
Tactic
Command and Control
Showing defanged values
- domaincfgsync-relay[.]eastus[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]comFallback C2 server for Backdoor.Lindnor
- domainmsrcontrib[.]comPrimary C2 server for Backdoor.Lindnor
- registry_keyHKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\AnyDeskRegistry key registering AnyDesk for Safe Mode
- sha25628357d9666a9be36b2ea9ac6007bb8bfbe7e2438e095c1ec40720c4001f47c62rustr.exe security-disabling tool
- sha2562fdfdd13a0c548bb68c9d5aa8599a9265d4659da3e237fe7a42ac6ac06b9a06aVulnerable driver fly.sys for BYOVD
- sha256467d1395b61d4b886329571b564fb21db01639acd2799439646c85b9aeaec175anydesk.exe legitimate RAT installed by attackers
- sha25647a864736764112d7897c76e56d51111ce75b3e46fdbac6933df8a5b29507d17safemode.exe configures AnyDesk for Safe Mode
- sha256588887e709459f1d1a8109b089cb3462c6f796d30b6297a1a0fdb3419a3ccbcehuntreagent.exe not blocked, purpose unknown
- sha2565a2082162852984ffe7e7c501faa6cf473129fcba29406ffb98d55198de4b3a5xs.scr security-disabling tool
- sha2565abe477517f51d81061d2e69a9adebdcda80d36667d0afabe103fda4802d33dbVulnerable driver havoc.sys used in BYOVD
- sha2565d2dd9caf2ae4a5083dbec16e688040456cdbc31eaeecbab78188e322ed0415bBackdoor.Lindnor variant (powerhost.exe, eventwatcher.exe)
- sha2565fcd2c954764ac0888c8ba72fc1cf54db64e8f23f83aeb0786ae5b80438ba926gibfor.exe security-disabling tool
- sha2566543ee9f89d80b2bcf08e98fb8e9e73a4b144a93c7b2a3f28e35de8f7e7a8a80bdr.exe security-disabling tool
- sha25667dee1d52189460b88f8ce5ffa76a5c22f86ffd67f8e689118019fce0863c321g.exe security-disabling tool
- sha25672d0b5615b996cbb01b1ca139e627079094f734da48a0435ffd8480a25d0a258Vulnerable driver monprocessex.sys for BYOVD
- sha25683eff3e51b69968a4ddd503b0b1dccfa8829d638f2dc00cc69640a29aea814f1hwaudioch.exe security-disabling tool
- sha256854c3e76beb200243ccf6af260e9a2089c2fc545f8f1b34d34c6fe86f2d056c3symgooq.exe security killer masquerading as Symantec
- sha2569058388d05d984ca691a23ee70fcdbd3266c5cdc68ebc5aed95c67f1c502bc75Vulnerable driver bdapiutil64.sys for BYOVD
- sha256962be6983f3ed4f1dc4ce117e135cc0a5ab8fc6b5f5aa0284eff8a9def66e338s1.exe not blocked, purpose unknown
- sha256aa779d811e00a30dfb56b994bdd63424cbf97617af737a218b6aff9f7c3a50f5gbbsym.exe security killer masquerading as Symantec
- sha256ad9575a9ef2dcc9d2fd2a24376c418549d4b3db5564c22b20081d33cf7629e43Backdoor.Lindnor variant (volumeproxy.exe)
- sha256cd1e68583b8b984a9bb5b9f7067077c0e0d8f79da4455c326319e5e5fc6e9c5ftest.exe security-disabling tool
- sha256cde8dbeaf15250337a03e07a7e257b12b03e5e951885cc69a578545f44425bddbackup.exe security-disabling tool
- sha256e69b882218fa2a19fd351741874bfcd10a6ae91076e6a8483795e0e357f8d026Anubis ransomware payload (iservice.exe)
- sha256e727d0753d2cd0b2f6eeba4cea53aa10b3ff3ed2afeb78f545fcf6d840f85c3eVulnerable driver xhunter1.sys for BYOVD
- sha256f8d4142a94269b4258f370ef2292d22a49cd6dee8266a7122f4531e9cc5d9a2fgibformin.exe security-disabling tool
- sha256fc200686175559f4544a5de826905f09a68476d889690a3be40ac32356790cb8Backdoor.Lindnor (healthcontroller64.exe, svchelper.exe)
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