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MATCHBOIL: New tricks, same old evil intentions

MATCHBOIL, a C# downloader used by Russia-aligned UAC-0099, evolves over two years with .NET Reactor obfuscation and sandbox evasion to deliver MATCHWOK backdoor to Ukrainian targets. Three HTTPS requests to a C&C server retrieve a numeric token, a hex-encoded PE payload (typically MATCHWOK backdoor), and a configuration file. Sandbox evasion checks include Windows Event Log uptime analysis, debugger detection, and OS install date verification. Persistence shifts between registry Run keys and scheduled tasks across versions.

Sens:▲ 24hConf:highAnalyzed:2026-11-05Z.ai

Authors: Fernando Tavella

ActorsUAC-0099SandwormMATCHBOILMATCHWOKLONEPAGE

Source:ESET

Indicators of Compromise12
4file path4sha12ip1mutex1registry key
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Detection / HunterZ.ai

Immediate Actions

  • Block C&C IPs 64[.]95[.]10[.]223 and 64[.]95[.]13[.]210 at network firewall
  • Block C&C domains flycloud-se, airarticlege, virtualdailyp, telemetry-con at DNS
  • Hunt for scheduled tasks named UpdateCheckers\DailyPlanner and MailClient\Checker
  • Search for files named MeowMeowProgramm.exe and SMTPClientApplication.exe in %LOCALAPPDATA%

Key Takeaways

  • April 2026 variant is first DLL executed by custom C# loader, named MATCHBOIL.V2 by CERT-UA
  • Sandbox check uses EventID 6013 uptime logs requiring three events with 7,200+ seconds uptime
  • Decoy GUI shifted from dairy daily planner to Regex Finder text search utility
  • UAC-0099 uses BitLaunch VPS, Cloudflare, and Let's Encrypt TLS certificates for C&C infrastructure
  • Payload filenames include MeowMeowProgramm.exe and SMTPClientApplication.exe

Attack Chain

  1. Initial Access: Spearphishing email with malicious link delivers archive containing VBScript
  2. Execution: VBScript downloads and executes MATCHBOIL C# downloader on victim machine
  3. Defense Evasion: Sandbox checks via event log uptime, debugger detection, OS install date
  4. C2: Three HTTPS requests retrieve token, hex-encoded MATCHWOK payload, and config file
  5. Persistence: Payload persisted via registry Run key or scheduled task

Affected Systems

  • Windows systems supporting .NET and WMI
  • Ukrainian government organizations
  • Ukrainian financial institutions
  • Ukrainian media organizations
  • Ukrainian transportation companies
  • Ukrainian energy and manufacturing companies

Detection Availability

  • Platforms: ESET blog, GitHub IoC repository

IoC list in GitHub repository; ESET detection names provided. No detection rules published.

Detection Engineering Assessment

Hunting Hypotheses

copy:
HypothesisTelemetryStageFP Risk
C# processes making HTTPS requests with custom SN and Count HTTP headers (T1071.001)Proxy logs with custom HTTP headersCommand and ControlLow — custom headers are unusual
Processes creating scheduled tasks named UpdateCheckers or MailClient (T1053.005)Windows Task Scheduler event logsPersistenceMedium — legitimate software also creates tasks
.NET executables querying WMI for Win32_Processor ProcessorId and BIOS serial (T1047)Sysmon Event ID 1 with WMI command-line argumentsDiscoveryMedium — inventory tools query similar WMI classes
.NET processes reading Windows Event Log EventID 6013 for system uptime (T1497.001)Sysmon Event ID 1, .NET assembly loading logsDefense EvasionLow — uncommon query for event ID 6013

Required Log Sources

  • Sysmon Event ID 1 process creation
  • Sysmon Event ID 11 file creation
  • Sysmon Event ID 12/13 registry changes
  • Windows Task Scheduler logs
  • DNS resolution logs
  • Proxy or HTTP logs

Control Gaps

  • Network inspection limited by TLS encryption and Cloudflare proxying
  • Static analysis hindered by .NET Reactor code virtualization
  • Sandbox evasion via event log uptime checks may bypass automated analysis
  • Custom HTTP headers may not trigger standard proxy signatures

Recommendations

Infrastructure Hardening

  • Block outbound connections to BitLaunch VPS IP ranges if not business-required
  • Inspect TLS traffic to C&C domains using TLS proxy with certificate validation
  • Monitor for Let's Encrypt certificates on internal-facing connections
  • Enable DNS logging and alerting for lookups to C&C domains

User Protection

  • Deploy EDR signatures for ESET detections MSIL/Agent.XXC and MSIL/Agent.YBX
  • Block execution of VBScript from email attachments
  • Quarantine machines with Global\PlannerAssistant mutex
  • Enable Windows Defender scheduled task monitoring

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

IOCs · 12
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