6 minhigh
MATCHBOIL: New tricks, same old evil intentions
MATCHBOIL, a C# downloader used by Russia-aligned UAC-0099, evolves over two years with .NET Reactor obfuscation and sandbox evasion to deliver MATCHWOK backdoor to Ukrainian targets. Three HTTPS requests to a C&C server retrieve a numeric token, a hex-encoded PE payload (typically MATCHWOK backdoor), and a configuration file. Sandbox evasion checks include Windows Event Log uptime analysis, debugger detection, and OS install date verification. Persistence shifts between registry Run keys and scheduled tasks across versions.
Sens:▲ 24hConf:highAnalyzed:2026-11-05Z.ai
Authors: Fernando Tavella
ActorsUAC-0099SandwormMATCHBOILMATCHWOKLONEPAGE
Source:ESET
Detection / HunterZ.ai
Immediate Actions
- Block C&C IPs 64[.]95[.]10[.]223 and 64[.]95[.]13[.]210 at network firewall
- Block C&C domains flycloud-se, airarticlege, virtualdailyp, telemetry-con at DNS
- Hunt for scheduled tasks named UpdateCheckers\DailyPlanner and MailClient\Checker
- Search for files named MeowMeowProgramm.exe and SMTPClientApplication.exe in %LOCALAPPDATA%
Key Takeaways
- April 2026 variant is first DLL executed by custom C# loader, named MATCHBOIL.V2 by CERT-UA
- Sandbox check uses EventID 6013 uptime logs requiring three events with 7,200+ seconds uptime
- Decoy GUI shifted from dairy daily planner to Regex Finder text search utility
- UAC-0099 uses BitLaunch VPS, Cloudflare, and Let's Encrypt TLS certificates for C&C infrastructure
- Payload filenames include MeowMeowProgramm.exe and SMTPClientApplication.exe
Attack Chain
- Initial Access: Spearphishing email with malicious link delivers archive containing VBScript
- Execution: VBScript downloads and executes MATCHBOIL C# downloader on victim machine
- Defense Evasion: Sandbox checks via event log uptime, debugger detection, OS install date
- C2: Three HTTPS requests retrieve token, hex-encoded MATCHWOK payload, and config file
- Persistence: Payload persisted via registry Run key or scheduled task
Affected Systems
- Windows systems supporting .NET and WMI
- Ukrainian government organizations
- Ukrainian financial institutions
- Ukrainian media organizations
- Ukrainian transportation companies
- Ukrainian energy and manufacturing companies
Detection Availability
- Platforms: ESET blog, GitHub IoC repository
IoC list in GitHub repository; ESET detection names provided. No detection rules published.
Detection Engineering Assessment
Hunting Hypotheses
| Hypothesis | Telemetry | Stage | FP Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| C# processes making HTTPS requests with custom SN and Count HTTP headers (T1071.001) | Proxy logs with custom HTTP headers | Command and Control | Low — custom headers are unusual |
| Processes creating scheduled tasks named UpdateCheckers or MailClient (T1053.005) | Windows Task Scheduler event logs | Persistence | Medium — legitimate software also creates tasks |
| .NET executables querying WMI for Win32_Processor ProcessorId and BIOS serial (T1047) | Sysmon Event ID 1 with WMI command-line arguments | Discovery | Medium — inventory tools query similar WMI classes |
| .NET processes reading Windows Event Log EventID 6013 for system uptime (T1497.001) | Sysmon Event ID 1, .NET assembly loading logs | Defense Evasion | Low — uncommon query for event ID 6013 |
Required Log Sources
- Sysmon Event ID 1 process creation
- Sysmon Event ID 11 file creation
- Sysmon Event ID 12/13 registry changes
- Windows Task Scheduler logs
- DNS resolution logs
- Proxy or HTTP logs
Control Gaps
- Network inspection limited by TLS encryption and Cloudflare proxying
- Static analysis hindered by .NET Reactor code virtualization
- Sandbox evasion via event log uptime checks may bypass automated analysis
- Custom HTTP headers may not trigger standard proxy signatures
Recommendations
Infrastructure Hardening
- Block outbound connections to BitLaunch VPS IP ranges if not business-required
- Inspect TLS traffic to C&C domains using TLS proxy with certificate validation
- Monitor for Let's Encrypt certificates on internal-facing connections
- Enable DNS logging and alerting for lookups to C&C domains
User Protection
- Deploy EDR signatures for ESET detections MSIL/Agent.XXC and MSIL/Agent.YBX
- Block execution of VBScript from email attachments
- Quarantine machines with Global\PlannerAssistant mutex
- Enable Windows Defender scheduled task monitoring
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping21 techniques
Tactic
Resource Development
Tactic
Initial Access
Tactic
Execution
Tactic
Persistence
Tactic
Stealth
Tactic
Discovery
Tactic
Command and Control
Showing defanged values
- file_pathC:\Users\Public\LibrariesConfig file directory, late 2025+
- file_path%LOCALAPPDATA%\DeviceMonitorPayload installation directory, 2024 samples
- file_path%LOCALAPPDATA%\MeowCheckPayload installation directory, late 2025
- file_path%LOCALAPPDATA%\SMTPClientPayload installation directory, April 2026
- ip64[.]95[.]10[.]223MATCHBOIL C&C IP on BL Networks VPS
- ip64[.]95[.]13[.]210MATCHBOIL C&C IP on BL Networks VPS
- mutexGlobal\PlannerAssistantMutex created by MATCHBOIL late 2025 variants
- registry_keyHKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunRegistry Run key used for payload persistence (DeviceMonitor value)
- sha1050926727cdd74f0b3a8a098e60b76d10fb06b14MATCHBOIL DLL variant, April 2026
- sha11e2c4aac30edff86cd9a30bd08b199bcd3d0ccceMATCHBOIL downloader, Feb 2026
- sha1c85d28f7d272ce2bbbfb9dae71d21bf25b8d00fcMATCHBOIL downloader, Feb 2026 variant
- sha1f886b615cb9e23ead2718ff2a61155acfb04ce9eMATCHBOIL downloader, Nov/Dec 2025