3 minhigh
Malicious Claude Code extension distributed through Cursor marketplace
Malicious Claude Code extension 2.1.313 on Cursor marketplace added SSH backdoor keys and reverse tunnel to 134.209.82.225, affecting up to 5,000 users. A malicious version of Anthropic's Claude Code extension (v2.1.313) was distributed through the Cursor marketplace on October 29, 2026 between 09:27 and 20:35 UTC. The extension adds attacker-controlled SSH keys to authorized_keys, attempts a reverse SSH tunnel to 134.209.82.225, and exfiltrates host details. Uninstalling the extension does not remove the backdoor components.
Sens:■ Immediate
Detection / HunterZ.ai
Immediate Actions
- Identify hosts with Cursor extension 2.1.313 installed during October 29 exposure window
- Remove attacker SSH keys from authorized_keys on affected hosts
- Kill any reverse SSH tunnel processes to 134[.]209[.]82[.]225
- Rotate credentials accessible from affected hosts
Key Takeaways
- Malicious extension version 2.1.313 distributed via Cursor marketplace
- Up to 5,000 users estimated affected across macOS and Windows
- SSH enablement fails on most hosts due to coding errors in the extension
- Uninstalling the extension leaves the SSH backdoor in place
- Exposure window: October 29, 2026, 09:27 to 20:35 UTC
Attack Chain
- Initial Access: Malicious Claude Code extension 2.1.313 published to Cursor marketplace
- Execution: Extension installed by up to 5,000 users during 09:27-20:35 UTC window
- Persistence: Attacker-controlled SSH key added to authorized_keys file
- C2: Reverse SSH tunnel attempted to 134[.]209[.]82[.]225
- Exfiltration: Host details sent to attacker infrastructure
Affected Systems
- macOS hosts running Cursor
- Windows hosts running Cursor
- Cursor extension marketplace users
- Systems with Claude Code extension 2.1.313
Detection Engineering Assessment
Hunting Hypotheses
| Hypothesis | Telemetry | Stage | FP Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| SSH keys added to authorized_keys by Cursor or extension-related processes (T1098.004) | EDR file modification events | Persistence | Medium — legitimate SSH key setup by administrators |
| Reverse SSH connections from workstations to external IPs (T1572) | Firewall egress logs for port 22 | Command and Control | Low — unusual for developer workstations |
| Host detail collection followed by external network connections from Cursor processes (T1082) | EDR process network correlation | Discovery | Low — atypical for extension behavior |
Required Log Sources
- EDR process and file events
- Firewall egress connection logs
- SSH authentication logs
- Endpoint file integrity monitoring
Control Gaps
- Cursor marketplace extension vetting lacks malware scanning
- Endpoint SSH key monitoring not commonly deployed
- Egress filtering for SSH from workstations often absent
Recommendations
Infrastructure Hardening
- Block 134[.]209[.]82[.]225 at network perimeter and proxy
- Monitor and restrict outbound SSH from workstation subnets
- Deploy file integrity monitoring for SSH authorized_keys files
User Protection
- Audit installed Cursor extensions for unauthorized or malicious versions
- Remove extension and all associated backdoor artifacts from affected hosts
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping3 techniques
Tactic
Persistence
Tactic
Discovery
Tactic
Command and Control
Showing defanged values
- ip134[.]209[.]82[.]225Reverse SSH tunnel C2 server for extension backdoor
Related
- Inside a malicious Claude Code-branded extension and its persistent SSH backdoor | Microsoft Security Blog·3
- Trusted Tool, Malicious Build: What the Trojanized Claude Code Extension Means for Developer Endpoints·3
- Trained to betray: How post-training supply chain attacks hijack coding agents | Microsoft Security Blog·1
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