6 minhigh
From Business Emails to XLoader: An Order Lure That Led to In-Memory Injection
XLoader delivered via business-themed emails uses a JScript-to-LuaJIT chain with RC4-packed in-memory injection and shared-section thread-context redirection to steal credentials from Windows hosts. The loader patches AMSI and ETW in-process, manually maps a packed PE through LuaJIT FFI, and decrypts the XLoader core via dual RC4 passes. XLoader transfers a clone into an x86 process through shared-section mapping with thread-context redirection. Sixteen C2 endpoints are configured with fixed selectors; the campaign also delivered Agent Tesla, Remcos, and XWorm.
Sens:▲ 24h
Detection / HunterZ.ai
Immediate Actions
- Block the 16 C2 endpoints and delivery IP 66[.]113[.]160[.]32 at network egress
- Quarantine emails with RAR attachments matching order or quotation themes
- Hunt for EHFTUOMQDRXVTJSF.exe and FSJTVXRDQMOUTFHE on endpoints
- If EDR supports host isolation, isolate hosts with matching file hashes
Key Takeaways
- 16 initial C2 endpoints configured with www.990match.com replacing final slot
- Campaign also delivered Agent Tesla, Remcos, and XWorm payloads
- Packer uses dual RC4: one full-region pass, then 15 per-block reinitializations
- 12 x86 injection targets include cleanmgr.exe, clip.exe, and getmac.exe
- Protected XLoader functions decrypted on-demand and re-encrypted after each call
Attack Chain
- Initial Access: Business-themed email delivers RAR archive containing obfuscated JScript
- Execution: JScript drops LuaJIT interpreter and Lua loader to Documents, launches hidden
- Defense Evasion: Lua loader patches AMSI strings and ETW exports, decodes embedded packed PE
- Execution: Packer decrypts XLoader core via dual RC4 passes and executes in LuaJIT thread
- Process Injection: XLoader maps shared section into x86 target, redirects thread context to clone
- C2 and Collection: XLoader contacts 16 configured endpoints over HTTP, enumerates Windows Vault and cookies
Affected Systems
- Windows workstations and servers (x86 and x64)
- Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe)
- Email clients receiving business-themed lures
- Windows Vault credential stores
- Browser cookie stores
Detection Engineering Assessment
Hunting Hypotheses
| Hypothesis | Telemetry | Stage | FP Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Windows Script Host spawning executables from user Documents with hidden window flag (T1059.007) | Process creation with parent wscript.exe or cscript.exe | Execution | Low — legitimate scripts rarely launch hidden executables from Documents |
| Shared section creation followed by NtSetContextThread modifying thread EIP in x86 processes (T1055.002) | Sysmon Event ID 8 and 10 with section mapping | Process Injection | Low — thread context modification is specific to injection |
| Ntdll export function prologue bytes replaced with RET instruction followed by NOPs (T1562.001) | Memory integrity monitoring for ntdll export modifications | Defense Evasion | Low — ntdll export patches do not occur in normal operations |
| Processes creating scheduled tasks with minute intervals referencing VBS launchers from Documents (T1053.005) | Task Scheduler operational log events | Persistence | Medium — some admin tools create frequent scheduled tasks |
Required Log Sources
- Sysmon Event ID 1 Process Creation
- Sysmon Event ID 11 File Creation
- Sysmon Event ID 8 CreateRemoteThread
- Sysmon Event ID 10 ProcessAccess
- Windows Task Scheduler operational log
- DNS and HTTP proxy logs
Control Gaps
- Signature-based AV may miss fileless in-memory execution stages
- Application allowlisting does not cover user-written JScript files
- Network egress filtering may not block all 16 C2 endpoints
- ETW patching prevents SIEM alert generation from affected hosts
Recommendations
Infrastructure Hardening
- Block outbound HTTP to configured C2 domains at proxy and firewall
- Restrict Windows Script Host execution for non-administrative users via policy
- Disable scheduled task creation for standard users where feasible
- Monitor for shared-section mapping events between disparate processes
User Protection
- Warn users about Greek Slovenian and English order-themed emails with RAR attachments
- Enforce Mark-of-the-Web on all email-attached archives
- Enable AMSI in CLR and enforce ETW provider integrity
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping13 techniques
Tactic
Initial Access
Tactic
Execution
Tactic
Privilege Escalation
Tactic
Stealth
Tactic
Credential Access
Tactic
Command and Control
Showing defanged values
- domainfocused-albattani[.]66-113-160-32[.]plesk[.]pageDelivery infrastructure hosting phishing emails
- domainwebmail[.]bekdachegroup[.]comReceived-chain host in email delivery path
- file_path%MyDocuments%\EHFTUOMQDRXVTJSF.exeDropped LuaJIT host executable
- file_path%MyDocuments%\EHFTUOMQDRXVTJSF.muiMarker for conditional persistence gate
- file_path%MyDocuments%\FSJTVXRDQMOUTFHEDropped extensionless Lua loader
- file_path%MyDocuments%\FSJTVXRDQMOUTFHE.vbsVBS launcher in conditional persistence path
- ip66[.]113[.]160[.]32Observed delivery relay for phishing emails
- sha25605ecf6621bc2f2303db6bab33cdc231cb1cd08895b4d089f7410b98b21c38c24RAR attachment variant
- sha25608aadfcffb61f90b0d3b34758048e0f699f241216d164c82919a6934488a52e9Unspecified hash from IOC table
- sha25621eb09400f387066649bec4c7fa63e4d4fd2171fb21a2b2ba182941325d76205ZIP attachment from English lure email
- sha25633dbb7d0c78bfa2e124b78409ecc7152a80016bbcccf39e960a2790d1efb8a22JScript from RAR attachment
- sha25638a498b126f8fc799a4f36f37b6d955fba6410d7eb02a9922eb21767897a8769RAR attachment from Slovenian lure
- sha25646e8d2bd454926641176ea67b2e357089ff411c89e524def0158a04b6103d7d4JScript from Naročilo RAR attachment
- sha256685c989f4d89b2402c167075d5d6d6e1f4573c0450adc1de3d8c08c65ed8ee9fDropped Lua loader decoding packed PE
- sha2566d7aaf1e563032ba46d8e0f1c8eab2b91d383fb2e5d00a1d4fff891f78a3572bEmail attachment EML file
- sha25678cb203de34c4a4c1961fe0e3700e6c76ab9b8b71dae9e2de408197fbc82733eRAR attachment variant in captured emails
- sha25678f08bdefb127c96a64229b591de7b3f984a451796ad132cb26ff54c76d073d4Email attachment EML file
- sha256896a4ddd93ab1d6fda5d57e71c5b2cf5db32970093350a1111396b2e80dc6686Email attachment EML file
- sha256be40d790d265afba64626b4e10fa2ff06e80119eb0056974407cf7d8e834745eEmail attachment EML file
- sha256d447a06cba8d3dbe80e09d73dd64576836b258961ee0d3ba56cf26cea7962b49Dropped LuaJIT executable hosting Lua loader
- sha256d87299e4a6457caccb6960c351003cb109748be9ab378cf31611461fce30ac28RAR attachment variant
- sha256e834ea9cd3025f8070778cf7ef8219976568cc28085feaf974912b64e5b77bc8RAR attachment delivered in email lures
- urlhxxp://511mma[.]ru/dnir/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 12
- urlhxxp://bagolone[.]it/qbqm/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 10
- urlhxxp://eolienzaer[.]com/jrsi/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 3
- urlhxxp://grandseosite91[.]shop/1ud5/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 8
- urlhxxp://hahashoe[.]com/r0zm/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 13
- urlhxxp://iqos-one[.]com/gf2n/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 1
- urlhxxp://komplek[.]id/gkws/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 6
- urlhxxp://moreultras[.]store/2r3a/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 9
- urlhxxp://offon33fv[.]club/6yav/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 2
- urlhxxp://okbajegame[.]com/l3iy/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 5
- urlhxxp://revelintravel[.]com/zd56/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 15
- urlhxxp://snvipvn[.]com/v0rc/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 14
- urlhxxp://sonhero[.]top/xc0y/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 7
- urlhxxp://tomatox[.]com[.]tw/upw6/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 11
- urlhxxp://tori[.]fi/8yfp/XLoader configured C2 endpoint slot 4
- urlhxxp://www[.]990match[.]com/ccp8/Primary C2 replacing final endpoint slot