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Break the silence: Kazakhstan-nexus UAT-6275 targets CIS government organizations

UAT-6275, a Kazakhstan-nexus APT, targets CIS government organizations using macro documents, PS2EXE downloaders, GitHub-hosted PowerShell, and a WinRAR exploit to deploy custom reverse shells. UAT-6275 employs four infection chains to deliver Chvost, Laplas, and PickleShell reverse shells to CIS government entities across nine countries. Exposed staging directories and GitHub repository xzj4/1 revealed payload builds, Linux tooling, and a FortiWeb CVE-2025-25257 PoC. Operator working hours align with UTC+5, supporting a Kazakhstan origin assessment.

Sens:▲ 24hConf:highAnalyzed:2026-11-05Z.ai

Authors: Ashley Shen

ActorsUAT-6275TAG-193Silent LynxYoroTrooperChvostLaplasPickleShell

Source:Cisco Talos

Indicators of Compromise8
2cve2filename1email1file path1ip1url
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Detection / HunterZ.ai

Immediate Actions

  • Patch WinRAR to address CVE-2025-8088 on all endpoints immediately
  • Block C2 IP 45[.]130[.]146[.]197 and monitor for GitHub repo xzj4/1
  • Deploy ClamAV signatures for PickleShell, Chvost, and Laplas
  • Audit Windows Startup folders for unexpected executables

Key Takeaways

  • Four infection chains evolved from VBA macros to WinRAR CVE-2025-8088 exploitation over 14 months
  • Custom reverse shells Chvost, Laplas, and PickleShell provide interactive remote access
  • Exposed GitHub repository xzj4/1 hosted PowerShell scripts with trackable commit history
  • Linux-compatible tooling and FortiWeb CVE-2025-25257 PoC recovered from staging directories
  • Operator working hours align with UTC+5 Astana, supporting Kazakhstan nexus assessment

Attack Chain

  1. Initial Access: Spear-phishing email delivers RAR archive containing malicious .lnk or decoy documents
  2. Execution: .lnk launches PowerShell to download and execute scripts from GitHub repo xzj4/1
  3. Persistence: PickleShell payload dropped to Windows Startup folder as wcrnsvc.exe or rnsdtc.exe
  4. Command and Control: PickleShell spawns cmd.exe and establishes TLS reverse shell to C2 on port 80
  5. Exfiltration: Interactive reverse shell enables data collection from compromised government hosts

Affected Systems

  • Windows endpoints with Word, PowerShell, WinRAR
  • Linux hosts (tooling recovered from infrastructure)
  • FortiWeb internet-facing appliances
  • CIS government and diplomatic organizations

Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

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CVEProductDescription
CVE-2025-8088WinRARAlternate Data Stream path traversal to drop payloads in Windows Startup folder
CVE-2025-25257FortiWebProof-of-concept exploit recovered from UAT-6275 staging infrastructure

Detection Availability

  • Published: Snort/Suricata, Other detection logic
  • Platforms: Snort 2, Snort 3, ClamAV

ClamAV signatures for PickleShell, Chvost, Laplas. Snort SIDs 1:11192, 1:15306, 1:46983, 1:47398, 4:16.

Detection Engineering Assessment

Hunting Hypotheses

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HypothesisTelemetryStageFP Risk
LNK files launching PowerShell that downloads content from GitHub repositories indicate Chain C delivery (T1059.001, T1566.001)Process creation, PowerShell script blocksExecutionMedium — legitimate admin scripts use GitHub
Executables placed in Windows Startup folder that spawn cmd.exe for reverse shell indicate PickleShell persistence (T1547.001, T1059.003)File creation events, process ancestryPersistenceLow — Startup folder exe drops are rare
WinRAR writing files to Startup folder via ADS path traversal indicates CVE-2025-8088 exploitation (T1204.002)File write events, process monitoringExecutionLow — WinRAR writing to Startup is abnormal
PS2EXE-packaged executables creating scheduled tasks indicate Chain B persistence activity (T1053.005, T1027)Scheduled task creation, process lineagePersistenceMedium — admin tools may use PS2EXE

Required Log Sources

  • Process creation events (Sysmon EID 1)
  • PowerShell script block logs (EID 4104)
  • Scheduled task creation (EID 4698)
  • File creation in Startup folder
  • Network connection events (EID 3)
  • DNS resolution logs

Control Gaps

  • Unpatched WinRAR allows CVE-2025-8088 path traversal exploitation
  • Legitimate GitHub traffic may bypass URL filtering policies
  • Scheduled task creation by packaged executables may not trigger alerts
  • Startup folder file creation may lack dedicated monitoring rules
  • TLS C2 on port 80 may blend with legitimate web traffic

Recommendations

Infrastructure Hardening

  • Enable Snort rules 1:11192, 1:15306, 1:46983, 1:47398 on network sensors
  • Restrict outbound PowerShell connections to GitHub from government endpoints
  • Patch FortiWeb appliances against CVE-2025-25257
  • Monitor DNS for queries to github.com from non-developer government hosts

User Protection

  • Enable EDR alerts for PowerShell launched from LNK files
  • Alert on executables dropped to Windows Startup folder paths
  • Monitor scheduled task creation by unknown or packaged executables
  • Deploy endpoint detection for reverse shell behavior via cmd.exe

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

IOCs · 8
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