5 Malicious npm Packages Typosquat Solana and Ethereum Libraries to Steal Private Keys

Key Takeaways

• Five malicious npm packages typosquatting Solana and Ethereum libraries were discovered stealing private keys.
• The packages hook standard key-handling functions (like decode() or the Wallet constructor) to silently exfiltrate keys to a hardcoded Telegram bot.
• The campaign relies on the Node.js 18+ fetch() API for exfiltration, failing silently on older runtimes.
• One package (bs58-basic) acts as a transitive dependency vector, containing no malicious code itself but pulling in the malicious base-x-64 package.

Affected Systems

• Node.js 18+ environments
• Solana developers
• Ethereum developers

Attack Chain

The threat actor publishes typosquatted npm packages mimicking legitimate Solana and Ethereum libraries. Developers inadvertently install these packages, either directly or via transitive dependencies. When the developer's application runs and processes private keys using standard functions (like decode() or the Wallet constructor), the malicious package intercepts the key material. The package then uses the native Node.js fetch() API to silently send the plaintext private key to a hardcoded Telegram bot, allowing the attacker to drain the compromised wallets.

Detection Availability

• YARA Rules: No
• Sigma Rules: No
• Snort/Suricata Rules: No
• KQL Queries: No
• Splunk SPL Queries: No
• EQL Queries: No
• Other Detection Logic: No
• Platforms: Socket

The article does not provide raw detection rules but notes that the Socket platform (AI Scanner, GitHub App, CLI, Firewall) can detect and block these malicious packages based on dependency graph analysis, obfuscation detection, and unexpected network calls.

Detection Engineering Assessment

EDR Visibility: Low — The malicious activity occurs entirely within the Node.js runtime environment using native APIs (fetch), making it difficult for standard EDRs to distinguish from legitimate application behavior without deep application-layer inspection. Network Visibility: Medium — Network monitoring can detect unexpected outbound HTTPS connections to api.telegram.org originating from development environments or production servers hosting Node.js applications. Detection Difficulty: Moderate — While the network IOCs (Telegram API) are clear, they are often lost in the noise of legitimate Telegram usage. Detecting the malicious packages requires robust SCA and dependency scanning tools.

Required Log Sources

• Network flow logs
• DNS query logs
• Software Composition Analysis (SCA) alerts

Hunting Hypotheses

Control Gaps

• Lack of transitive dependency scanning
• Permissive egress network filtering on developer endpoints

Key Behavioral Indicators

• Node.js applications making unexpected calls to Telegram Bot APIs
• Presence of obfuscated JavaScript arrays and rotation ciphers in node_modules
• Packages re-exporting crypto primitives with thin wrappers

False Positive Assessment

• Low

Recommendations

Immediate Mitigation

• Audit package.json for raydium-bs58, base-x-64, base_xd, bs58-basic, and ethersproject-wallet and remove them immediately.
• Treat any private keys processed by these packages as compromised, move funds, and rotate keys immediately.

Infrastructure Hardening

• Implement strict egress network filtering to block unexpected outbound connections to messaging platforms like Telegram from production servers.
• Enforce allow/deny rules for npm packages in CI/CD pipelines.

User Protection

• Deploy browser extensions or IDE plugins that surface risk signals for npm packages before installation.
• Educate developers on verifying package names and scopes (e.g., using @ethersproject/wallet instead of typosquats).

Security Awareness

• Train development teams on the risks of typosquatting and the importance of auditing transitive dependencies.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1195.002 - Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
• T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
• T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information
• T1552.004 - Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys
• T1071.001 - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Additional IOCs

• Domains:
  • api[.]telegram[.]org - Legitimate domain abused for C2 exfiltration.
• Urls:
  • hxxps://t[[.]]me/+IDl6XgFBZdI1ZjZh - Telegram Group Invite leaked in the raydium-bs58 package source code.
• File Hashes:
  • 5bfef9a8d08b7efb5054019383f97b5526535331 (SHA1) - ethersproject-wallet package hash
  • 4e7facc47d028ecde8d4f0fe36968c79a6e9d1cd (SHA1) - base-x-64 package hash
  • 0e6ad52c5377fd60065c8d91fe12485cb8c79ea7 (SHA1) - bs58-basic package hash
  • 23ce64d018ff8adbb2426958794a4e718d2a30c8 (SHA1) - raydium-bs58 package hash
  • 52715dc8a1b766e492e245cb798e83d50021138cc2d05ec4eacf42cbfac7541d (SHA256) - raydium-bs58/index.js file hash
  • 725cde7a57d75d56f5a75a0482150461594d4558e42425ff0600dfbe5bfb7ba9 (SHA256) - base-x-64/src/esm/index.js file hash
  • 73f452ad6754d669c7a86a9633ddbc1e14717434df710f306096a7a4960ca09b (SHA256) - base_xd/src/esm/index.js file hash
  • 65a04d9264e3ce76137e7832d17f3e3b122e4ffdf0dac6676bed4d200ca22401 (SHA256) - bs58-basic/src/cjs/index.cjs file hash
  • c3cfbc8586be14798155fbd50650bc3ca6f7a53428c14b13e372e8544b73c2f4 (SHA256) - bs58-basic/src/esm/index.js file hash
  • 0ea3af80b159d812334a97842a31ba77079fdfc33a8702cdfc29a0dfe33c015a (SHA256) - ethersproject-wallet/lib/index.js file hash
  • fa1ce4d1ba3aaedc3cda180d4ae0efe2b0c9d90a028a721b0f3efff6ba7e1cd5 (SHA256) - ethersproject-wallet/lib.esm/index.js file hash
• File Paths:
  • src/cjs/index.cjs - Location of the obfuscated exfiltration payload in base-x-64 and base_xd.
• Other:
  • galedonovan0121@gmail[.]com - npm registered email for the threat actor.
  • @crypto_sol3 - Telegram Group Creator Username.
  • 7847516435 - Telegram Group Creator User ID.